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DEAR READER
A Letter From T
he
Co-Chairs
Dear Reader,
Few of us are unaw
are that there are i
mperfections in th
e way we provide h
ealth care 
to our nation’s vete
rans. After the head
lines of 2014, Ame
ricans of all stripes
—veterans 
and civilians, Demo
crats and Republica
ns—know we can d
o better.
Concerned Vetera
ns for America aim
s to be part of the
 solution. Last fal
l, CVA 
convened a Taskfo
rce that we called 
“Fixing Veterans H
ealth Care.” The m
ission 
of the Taskforce w
as straightforward
: to propose concr
ete reforms, that c
ould be 
turned into legisla
tion that would dr
amatically improv
e the delivery of h
ealth care  
to veterans.
We are veterans an
d health care exper
ts with a shared ch
arge: to do the righ
t thing to 
meet the needs of 
veterans. In order 
to advance this mi
ssion, our Taskfor
ce took an 
honest, inquisitive,
 and nonpartisan lo
ok at the veterans’ 
health care delivery
 system. 
Today’s system fo
r veterans health c
are exists for a rea
son. But few polic
ymakers, 
afforded a clean sl
ate, would recreate
 it in its current fo
rm. Modern vetera
ns health 
care delivery is rip
e for a full-scale re
assessment, and th
is report aims to d
eliver one.
Our due diligence
 process was veter
an-centered, exper
t-driven, and open
-minded, 
with a focus on sys
temic reforms to th
e Department of V
eterans Affairs-the
 Veterans 
Health Administra
tion (VHA) specifi
cally. The timeliness
 and quality of care 
for veterans 
varies throughout t
he country, driven b
y a myriad of know
n and unknown var
iables. We 
asked questions ab
out eligibility, acces
s, choice, and accou
ntability in the VH
A. 
The majority of em
ployees at VHA ar
e dedicated and com
petent professional
s. Standing 
in their way are bu
reaucratic constrai
nts that make it ha
rd to innovate and
 leave little 
incentive for excelle
nce. Furthermore, t
here are storm clou
ds on the demograp
hic horizon 
that will place add
itional pressure on
 veterans health ca
re facilities. In ord
er to avoid 
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ineffective and reactionary policies in the futu
re, our goal was to proactively ensure 
that eligible veterans of today and tomorrow
 receive timely and quality care. 
In working to develop the best policies for fi
xing veterans’ health care, we sought 
perspectives from health care scholars, expe
rienced policymakers, veterans service 
organizations and—most importantly—vete
rans all across the country. You cannot 
come up with veteran-centered reforms with
out understanding what veterans need 
and want. Our questions to each participant
 in our process were always the same: 
What’s working?  What isn’t?  What must be
 reformed?  What must be protected? 
How do we put the veteran at the center of v
eterans’ health care? 
Fundamental change to any system threatens t
he status quo, often provoking attacks on 
both the messenger and message. We anticipate t
his may happen to us and to our proposal. 
But because of our thorough process, we rest a
ssured that veterans across America will 
eagerly welcome our proposal. We are comm
itted to these recommendations, and to 
the follow-through required to advance them: 
continuing our commitment to Lincoln’s 
promise “to care for him who shall have born
e the battle.”
We would like to thank CVA’s CEO Pete Heg
seth, our Taskforce Executive Director 
Darin Selnick, and the entire policy team at C
VA for their indispensible support in 
this endeavor. We look forward to sharing our
 findings. Thank you for your interest in 
joining us to serve America’s veterans.
Sincerely,
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
8Chapter 1: Executive Summary
Politicians don’t often agree, 
BUT THEY DO AGREE ON THIS:
America has a responsibility to care for veterans 
disabled or injured in the line of duty while 
serving honorably in our military. The question 
is not whether entitled veterans should receive 
timely and quality health care; the question is 
how to best deliver that care. In order to keep 
faith with America’s wounded warriors—while 
remaining good stewards of taxpayer dollars—it 
is critically important that we get the how right.
Since 1776, America’s leaders have wrestled with the how: struggling 
to find the correct balance of financial resources, physical facilities, 
eligibility requirements, and delivery mechanisms. Over the past 
two centuries, a pattern of “reform and failure” has repeated itself. 
Problems with veterans programs emerge, and in response, the 
government enacts well-intentioned reforms. Sometimes the 
government gets it right, and sometimes it misses the mark 
Sometimes the same problems re-emerge after a period of 
improvement. Some veterans receive quality, timely health care; 
others receive delayed and substandard care. 
In 1921, when the Veterans Bureau was created, the nation’s 
civilian health care infrastructure was sparse. Today we have the 
most developed health care infrastructure in the world. Indeed, 
U.S. health care spending represents more than seventeen percent 
of the nation’s economic output, dwarfing the Veterans Health 
Administration’s health care spending.1 Moreover, VHA enrollees 
already receive on average three-quarters of their care, measured in 
dollars, from non-VHA health care sources. There is no reason for 
veterans to wait in line for health care at VA facilities.
Yet, as the recent Department of Veterans Affairs wait-time 
scandal revealed, today’s veterans are not being adequately served 
by the VHA. Despite a $91 billion cumulative increase in the 
VA’s budget since 2006, and a 101,000-person increase in the VA’s 
staff, the timeliness of health care delivery for a shrinking veteran 
population  has not improved.
In addition, the quality of care appears to be mixed, and is certainly 
not commensurate with the VHA’s massive growth in funding 
and personnel. Recent attempts to address perceived funding and 
staffing shortfalls at the VHA have failed to meet the twenty-first 
century needs of veterans.
If proactive and fundamental reforms are not made soon, 
demographic realities will force further drastic and reactionary 
changes. As the Vietnam generation passes on, the size of the 
veteran population will shrink considerably. In 2009, there 
were 24 million U.S. veterans; by 2029, the VA 
expects that population to shrink to 16 million. 
The number of VHA enrollees, while older in age, will shrink as 
well. Advances in medical technology have also led to fewer 
hospitalizations and more care delivered in physicians’ offices. 
Future wars could, of course, re-expand the veteran population, 
but this is not a possibility that the VHA can either predict or rely 
upon. Moreover, given the scale, flexibility, and competence of 
America’s private health care sector, maintaining costly excess 
capacity in VHA can no longer be rationalized as a hedge against 
future contingencies. The VHA must get ahead of its demographic 
destiny, or be overcome by it.
VetsCare
Policy Reccomendation #6 
9We believe there are two choices in confronting these challenges. 
On the one hand, we could advance incremental reforms to the 
current system, leading to incremental improvements in the near 
term. But this course would not empower veterans to choose the 
health care best for them and would ignore looming demographic 
realties. On the other hand, we could advance long-term reforms 
of the current system, while addressing the immediate needs of 
veterans and in doing so, give veterans control over their own 
health care, improve the sustainability of VHA facilities for the 
long haul, and break the government cycle of reform and failure.
We enthusiastically choose the latter option. Now is the time to 
ensure that all eligible veterans—young and old, male and female, 
rich and poor, urban and rural—are the centerpiece of veterans 
health care. For too long, concerns unique to the VHA as a legacy 
institution have distorted the planning, funding and delivery of 
health care for veterans. While the VHA will remain an important 
component of veterans health care delivery, we firmly believe that 
veterans’ interests must take precedence.
America’s veterans agree. Our nationwide, nonpartisan survey 
found that 90 percent of veterans favor reforming veterans’ health 
care, and that 89 percent believe it is “very important” that these 
reforms include “increasing health care choices for veterans.” Eighty-
six percent believe that eligible veterans should be able to choose a 
private physician, and 77 percent believe veterans should be given 
this choice—even if it costs them a little more out of pocket. Bottom 
line: veterans want choices.
The Veterans Access, Choice and Accountability Act of 2014 
(VACAA), passed by Congress in 2014, expands veterans’ choices 
somewhat. Under these reforms, the VHA serves as the gatekeeper 
for care and limits the number of veterans who qualify for private 
health care choices. Geographic restrictions are made based on VA 
facilities, not where veterans receive care, and wait-time restrictions 
are based on what the VA deems “medically necessary,” not when a 
veteran requests an appointment. 
Furthermore, the VHA’s implementation of these reforms has 
been slow and confusing. The VACAA is a good first step, but 
it is a temporary one whose funding is expected to run out in a 
few years. In February 2015, VA Secretary Robert McDonald 
proposed reducing the VACAA’s budget for privately-provided 
veterans health care, and reallocating those funds for other purposes. 
In the end, VACAA has kept the VA bureaucracy in control, and 
offers few real choices to veterans.
This Taskforce seeks to flip that equation. Our proposal puts 
veterans in control of their health care. This approach is not anti-
VHA. It is pro-veteran. The VA should be given every opportunity 
to compete for veterans’ health care dollars. But it can no longer take 
veterans for granted as customers. Some veterans get great care from 
the VA and will want to continue doing so. Others do not and will 
not. Ultimately our veterans deserve the same degree of choice that 
is available to other Americans.
In pursuing this goal we agreed on these 10 
core reform principles:
86%
77%
Believe that eligible veterans 
should be able to choose a 
private physician
 believe veterans should be 
given this choice—even if it 
costs them a little more out 
of pocket
Principles For Veterans’ 
Health Care Reform
The veteran must come first, not the VA. The institutional priorities of the VHA weigh too heavily in 
current planning, funding and care delivery decisions. We believe the interests of veterans should be paramount.
Refocus on, and prioritize, veterans with service-connected disabilities and specialized 
needs. Veterans with service-connected disabilities and specialized health care needs should be heavily prioritized; any 
reforms should ensure that VHA health care delivery centers on service-connected veterans and leveraging the VHA’s 
comparative advantage in specialized areas.
VHA should be improved, and thereby preserved. Those veterans who choose to use VHA facilities 
should receive timely and quality care. In order to achieve this goal, the VHA should be restructured—as an independent, 
efficient, and modern organization—that can compete with private providers.
Grandfather current enrollees. Veterans should have the option to seek care outside of VA system but current 
enrollees who wish to continue to receive care within the system should retain the option to do so. Currently enrolled veterans 
will also have the option to “opt-in” to the reformed system.
Veterans should be able to choose where to get their health care. Based on eligibility, veterans should 
have the option to take their earned health care funds and use them to access care at the VA or in the voluntary (civilian) 
health care system. Because private health care is somewhat costlier than VHA-based care, most veterans who choose this 
option will be expected to share in some of the costs of such care, through co-pays and deductibles.
Veterans health care reform should not be driven by the budget. More efficient health care for our 
veterans may reduce the cost of their care, but reform should not be viewed as an avenue to reduce federal spending. Conversely, 
increased funding is insufficient to address VHA’s deficiencies. Thankfully, our fiscal modeling suggests reform can be achieved 
in a revenue-neutral manner.
Address veterans’ demographic inevitabilities. The VHA must be reformed now, or demographic changes 
in the veteran population will force difficult—and inevitable—changes in the future. Any reform proposal must consider 
substantial forthcoming demographic shifts in the veteran population, including substantial shrinkage in overall numbers—
save for another protracted conflict—and disproportionate decreases in future enrollment.
Break VHA’s cycle of “reform and failure.” Minor tweaks to the current system may incrementally improve 
health care in the near term, but the monopolistic VHA bureaucracy is likely to return to a standard operating procedure 
heavily influenced by the desires and concerns of the institution and its employees. Only fundamental reform will break the cycle 
and empower veterans.
Implementing reform will require bipartisan vision, courage and commitment. A well-con-
nected VA bureaucracy, parochial congressional concerns, and powerful outside groups frequently stifle difficult reforms 
across the government—and the same could happen with VHA reform.
VHA needs accountability. The VHA must be accountable to both veterans and taxpayers for its performance. An 
independent VHA will have more latitude to reward high performers, fire poor performers, and monitor the quality of health 
care delivery.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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These principles provide the guiding foundation for reform, but the 
devil is always in the details. Turning these principles into policies 
was the most time-consuming aspect of our work and will involve 
the greatest challenge for policymakers. We were hindered in our 
efforts by a dearth of readily available data from the VA; such data 
is needed to build a model that can accurately forecast the fiscal 
and economic impact of different options for reform.
We aren’t the only ones to point out this unacceptable information 
gap. In a December 2014 report, the Congressional Budget Office 
noted that “comparing health care costs in the VHA system and 
the private sector is difficult partly because the Department of 
Veterans Affairs…has provided limited data to Congress and the 
public about its costs and operational performance.” CBO then 
suggested the VA be required to provide detailed annual reports 
to Congress, like those tendered by the Department of Defense 
concerning TRICARE.
This, at a bare minimum, should be required of the VA, the VHA, 
and any successor entities. They should publicly report on all aspects 
of their operation, including quality, safety, patient experience, 
timeliness, and cost-effectiveness. That way, policymakers and 
reformers can take into account detailed information about the 
veterans’ population and VHA enrollees in particular, to better 
understand their needs, and their probable behavior when offered 
different alternatives.
We believe this report offers a strong start and foundation for 
policymakers, although we acknowledge that our recommendations 
will benefit from further examination, refinement and fiscal modeling. 
We know there remain both “known unknowns” and “unknown 
unknowns” in the veterans health care sphere, and present our 
recommendations and assumptions with the requisite humility. 
59%
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The gradual expansion of the VHA’s mission to provide health 
care to an ever-increasing pool of veterans has made it more 
difficult to perform its original mission of caring for veterans 
injured in service to our country, greatly increased the cost of 
VA health care, and contributed to the many access issues that 
are highlighted in the history portion of this report. It is worth 
noting that 59 percent of the current unique VHA patients 
do not have a service-connected disability. We feel strongly 
that these reforms are an opportunity for Congress to move 
VA health care gradually back to its service-connected care 
roots, using our report as a baseline for further refinement and 
precision. Appropriately involving the private sector can assure 
no bifurcation of care and can essentially eliminate the cyclical 
excess capacity issue that has plagued VHA. 
Among our “known unknowns” are how many veterans would 
select our choice plans and what the consequent cost would 
be. We decided to base our fiscal modeling and structure of 
recommendations on current patient eligibility because of the 
dearth of detailed information on the true costs of VA health 
care-more “known unknowns”. We cannot emphasize enough 
how important it is for Congress to demand that the VHA 
provide detailed and transparent accounting of how they spend 
their appropriated funds. Only then, will the true cost of caring 
for our nation’s veterans be understood. We did not alter the 
current priority groups since that would have made any fiscal 
modeling even more difficult. 
For these reasons and others, this report proposes an overall 
roadmap for reform, entitled The Veterans Independence Act: 
Transforming Veterans Health Care for the Twenty-First Century. 
We do so with a humble understanding that no plan is perfect. 
While we believe that our proposal would significantly improve 
veterans health care, we know the plan would benefit from 
continued refinement and input from interested parties. With 
this caveat in place, we propose three major 
categories of reform:
 of the current unique VHA patients do not have a 
service-connected disability
12
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The Veterans
Independence 
Act: 
Restructure the VHA as an independent, 
government-chartered non-profit corporation. 
The VHA would function more effectively as an independent 
organization that is fully empowered to make difficult 
decisions on personnel, facilities, partnerships, and other 
priorities—all in the interest of serving eligible veterans 
better. Presently, VHA is charged with delivering health care 
outcomes, while constrained by parochial bureaucratic and 
political priorities. As an independent entity—answering to its 
customers and balance sheet—it would be liberated to make 
the decisions necessary to ensure veterans who continue to 
choose VHA receive quality and timely care. In addition, we 
believe that separating the VHA into two functional entities— 
one, the provider of health care services and the other, the 
payor of health insurance premiums and claims—will give 
veterans more options.
Give veterans the option to seek private health 
coverage with their VA funds. 
The dollars needed for veterans’ service-connected health care 
should follow veterans wherever they choose to seek care. Our 
analysis suggests a premium support model for eligible 
veterans would be well suited to deliver authentic choice for 
many, perhaps most, veterans; but other health care delivery 
mechanisms should also be considered. Likewise, veterans 
who prefer high-deductible coverage would gain the additional 
option of directing the remainder of their premium support 
benefit into an interest-bearing health savings account.
Veterans education benefits serve as an attractive model for 
VA health care reform. Through the GI Bill, veterans who 
meet eligibility requirements have the opportunity to use 
taxpayer dollars to pursue the accredited academic institution 
of their choice. VA determines the eligibility, ensures academic 
institutions meet a certain standard, and monitors the process 
for payment. The VA does not, however, require veterans to 
receive their education through a “Veterans University,” or tell 
veterans what schools they can attend. The same principle 
can apply to heath care, with VHA giving veterans general 
guidance and assistance, if they seek it.
Refocus veterans health care on those with 
service-connected injuries. 
That was the VA’s original mission: to provide health care 
for those who bear the physical and mental scars of war. For 
decades, often in order to justify its existence, the VHA has 
expanded eligibility requirements to those without service- 
connected health needs. But, when it comes to health care 
obligations, not every veteran is created equal. Those veterans 
with service-connected health needs should be prioritized 
in the current system, and even more so for future veterans. 
Such an approach permits the VA to focus on providing quality 
and timely care to eligible veterans who most need it.
We hope that our proposal serves to kick start a long overdue 
national conversation. For years, veterans’ advocates, health care 
experts, and members of Congress—on both sides of the aisle—
have privately echoed the recommendations we discuss herein. 
But those echoes have remained behind closed doors, due to an 
adversarial political climate. Our goal is to bring that principled 
conversation into the public square for robust debate, and thereby 
help policymakers advance legislation that achieves lasting reform 
of veterans’ health care.
We believe that our proposal could reshape the VHA reform 
debate, because it truly places veterans at the center of their own 
health care. Concerned Veterans for America will fight to advance 
these reforms, and looks forward to working with lawmakers on 
both sides of the aisle to turn them into reality. Together, we can 
improve the lives of those who fought to defend the freedom we love.
Policy Recommendations
Separate the VA’s payor and provider functions into separate institutions.
In order to best offer veterans the option of receiving care from private physicians, the 
VA’s health insurance function should be separated from its function as a provider 
of hospital and clinical care. The Veterans Independence Act proposes dividing the 
VHA’s existing responsibilities into the Veterans Health Insurance Program (VHIP) 
and the Veterans Accountable Care Organization (VACO).
Establish the Veterans Health Insurance Program (VHIP) as a program office 
in the Veterans Health Administration.
VHIP would administer the VA’s health insurance and premium support programs 
within the Department of Veterans Affairs. Over time, the purpose of VHIP would 
evolve to subsidizing veterans’ health coverage, from private and public institutions, 
while maintaining a market for private health insurance plans that offer veterans the 
choice of voluntary and VA health care providers.
Establish the Veterans Accountable Care Organization (VACO) as a non-profit 
government corporation fully separate from the Department of Veterans Affairs.
VACO would encompass the VA’s brick and mortar health care facilities. The Veterans 
Independence Act proposes to establish the VACO as a non-profit government 
corporation that is fully separate from the Department of Veterans Affairs, along the 
lines of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation. 
The VHA would continue to administer VHIP and the other non-provider programs 
currently under its purview, such as the domiciliary care, programs for homeless veterans, 
administering education and training for health care personnel, conducting health care 
research and providing contingency support for DoD and HHS during times of war or 
national emergency.
Institute a VA medical center realignment procedure (MRAC) modeled after 
the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990 BRAC.                                                     
 VA medical center capacity is not efficiently designed to serve the needs of veterans. 
In some areas, VA medical facilities are scarce, forcing veterans to drive long distances 
to receive care. In other areas, VA facilities go largely unused, due to overcapacity and 
demographic shifts.
The profoundly inefficient distribution and scale of VA facilities serves veterans poorly, 
not only because they are difficult to access but also due to cost. The high fixed costs 
associated with maintaining unused VA medical centers utilize funds that could be 
applied to improve the quality of veterans’ health coverage. 
RESTRUCTURING THE VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
1.
2.
3.
4.
Below is a more specific outline of our policy recommendations. Further details are available in 
the main body of the report.
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EXPANDING VETERANS’ HEALTH CARE CHOICES
5.
6.
We hope the independence of the Veterans Accountable Care Organization will enable 
it to freely rationalize and manage its facilities to more efficiently devote its resources to 
veterans’ care. If, in practice, it does not enjoy this freedom, the Veterans Independence 
Act will provide ongoing authority for the president to institute a medical center 
realignment procedure modeled after the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act 
of 1990 (BRAC).
Under MRAC, like BRAC, the president would be empowered to appoint an independent 
nine-member panel whose recommendations for medical center closures become law, 
unless Congress formally passes a resolution objecting to those recommendations within 
45 days. For example, there could be an automatic trigger whereby the MRAC panel 
reviews VA facilities that have filled less than 30 percent of their beds on an average daily 
basis over a five-year period.
Require the VHA to report publicly on all aspects of its operation, including quality, 
safety, patient experience, timeliness, and cost-effectiveness.
In 2014, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) attempted to compare health care 
costs in the VA system with those in other U.S. health care systems. However, 
CBO noted “comparing health care costs in the VHA system and the private sector is 
difficult partly because the Department of Veterans Affairs…has provided limited 
data to Congress and the public about its costs and operational performance.” 
In order for the government to better monitor and exact continuous improvement 
on the VA system, the VHA should publicly report on all aspects of its operation, 
including quality, safety, patient experience, timeliness, and cost-effectiveness, using 
standards similar to those in the Medicare Accountable Care Organization program.
Preserve the traditional VA health benefit for current enrollees who prefer it, 
while offering an option to seek coverage from the private sector.
Under the Veterans Independence Act, all currently enrolled veterans from Priority 
Groups 1 through 8 would continue to be eligible for traditional VA health care. Those 
who are satisfied with their current coverage would be able to maintain it, with no 
additional changes or cost-sharing. In addition, currently enrolled veterans would also 
gain the option of choosing private health insurance, including plans customized for the 
veteran population.
VetsCare Federal
Veterans who are satisfied with VA health care would be able to maintain their existing 
coverage, with no changes to benefits or cost-sharing. This plan would be called VetsCare 
Federal. Veterans in this plan would have full access to the VA’s integrated health care 
system, the Veterans Accountable Care Organization.
VetsCare ChoiCe
Like VA employees, our veterans should be free to choose their own source of health 
insurance. This program would be called VetsCare Choice, and offers veterans the 
ability to purchase heavily discounted private health coverage.
Chapter 1: Executive Summary
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Specifically, enrolled veterans would be able to use the funds currently spent on them 
through the VA health care system to purchase private health coverage through a 
mechanism called premium support, comparable to the way VA employees obtain 
coverage through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. 
Veterans in higher Priority Groups would be offered larger amounts of premium 
support. In addition, the VetsCare Choice program would be phased in, such that 
Priority Groups 1 through 3 would gain access to the program upon enactment of 
the Veterans Independence Act and Groups 4 through 8 would become eligible for 
the program within five years after enactment.
The VetsCare Choice program would fully fund premiums for a benchmarked health 
insurance plan according to the following schedule. Veterans who are 100 percent disabled 
due to a service-connected injury will receive the option of “Diamond” coverage with 
zero cost sharing: in health insurance parlance, the plan would retain an actuarial value 
of 100 percent. The remaining Priority Group 1 and 2 veterans would gain the option of 
“Platinum” coverage in which co-pays and deductibles would cover 10 percent of expected 
costs; i.e., an actuarial value of 90 percent.
Members of Priority Group 3 and 4 would gain the option of “Gold” coverage with an 
actuarial value of 80 percent; Priority Groups 5 and 6, “Silver” coverage with an actuarial 
value of 70 percent; Priority Groups 7 and 8, “Bronze” coverage with an actuarial value 
of 60 percent. 
For all VetsCare Choice plans, services delivered in VA facilities or by VA physicians 
would be covered at 100 percent, with no cost-sharing. Hence, veterans who purchase 
private health coverage through this program would continue to be able to use VA 
facilities through insurance products that contract with VA providers. The Veterans 
Independence Act would create a mechanism to ensure that VetsCare Choice health 
plans contract with VA facilities for this purpose.
Additionally, veterans who prefer high-deductible coverage—i.e., insurance plans 
with more cost sharing and a lower actuarial value—would have the choice to do 
so. Because such plans are less costly than conventional insurance plans, veterans 
would gain the option of directing the difference in price into an interest-bearing 
health savings account.
VetsCare senior
Enrolled veterans over the age of 65, and those who qualify for Medicare due to disability, 
would gain the option of using their VA funds to defray the costs of Medicare premiums 
and supplemental coverage (“Medigap”). This plan would be called VetsCare Senior.
As with VetsCare Choice, all veterans who purchase private health coverage in this 
manner would continue to be able to use VA facilities, through insurance products 
that contract with VA providers. The Veterans Independence Act would create a 
mechanism to ensure that VetsCare Senior health plans contract with VA facilities 
for this purpose.
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Reform health insurance coverage for future veterans.
For future veterans, those who are eligible , would be entirely transitioned into the 
premium support system, providing a clear path for integration of veterans’ health care 
into the broader health care system. New eligibility requirements would go into effect 
for those veterans who applied for enrollment after a predetermined cutoff date.
Eligibility for sponsored health coverage would be based on the current Priority Group 
requirements. However, veterans with service-connected disabilities—i.e., those in 
Priority Groups 1 through 3—would be even more highly prioritized with the most 
robust coverage, minimal cost-sharing, and expedited access to VHA facilities. The 
program would also assist disadvantaged veterans, such as those in Priority Groups 4 
through 6.  
Offer veterans access to the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program.
Unlike acute-care insurance, which pays for hospital and other medical costs due to 
illness or injury, long-term care insurance is designed to finance the costs of care for 
individuals who can no longer perform everyday tasks—such as getting in and out 
of bed, getting dressed, or using the bathroom—without assistance. High quality 
long-term care is an important part of supporting veterans with service-connected 
health care needs.
Under the Veterans Independence Act, eligible veterans would gain the option of enrolling 
in the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program, a benefit currently available to VA 
employees, and also to active and retired members of the uniformed services. In addition, 
veterans could apply the equivalent premium support payment to the purchase of alternative 
long-term care insurance.
Create a VetsCare Implementation Commission, a nonpartisan legislative 
branch agency, to implement the Veterans Independence Act. 
As we have seen in the past, the mission is not over once Congress has passed a bill. 
If the Veterans Independence Act were to be enacted, it would be incumbent upon 
Congress to “keep the foot on the gas” and ensure appropriate progress with the 
implementation of VHA reform.
With that in mind, the Veterans Independence Act would create a nonpartisan 
commission, modeled after the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), 
to assist and advise congress and the Department of Veterans Affairs on veterans health 
reform. Membership in the VetsCare Implementation Commission would comprise 
solely of health care experts in academia, the private sector, and the veterans community.
The Commission’s mandate would be to manage the implementation of reform, to 
monitor progress in delivering reform, to continuously assess the quality of VA health 
care delivery and coverage, and to recommend refinements to congressional statutes 
and federal regulations where needed to improve veterans’ care.
7.
8.
9.
MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF VETERANS’ HEALTH REFORM
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2.  
INTRODUCTION
Background
IN THE SPRING OF 2014,
whistleblowers at the Phoenix 
VA hospital alleged that 
administrators at that facility 
were using secret wait lists 
to conceal the true amount of 
time it took for eligible veterans 
to access health care in the 
hospital’s various clinics. 
In addition, those whistleblowers also 
alleged that dozens of veterans died waiting 
for medically necessary care while on 
manipulated wait lists. Eventually, through 
multiple audits, congressional inquiries, and 
VA Inspector General investigations, it was 
determined that the majority of VA hospitals 
were using some form of a manipulated 
wait list to hide the true wait times for their 
patients—and that hundreds of thousands 
of veterans are still waiting long periods of 
time to access needed health care. 
These revelations forced the resignation 
of the Secretary of the VA, the Under 
Secretary for Health for the VA, and other 
top VA officials across the country, in 
addition to precipitating further investiga-
tions of over one thousand VA employees 
for their involvement in the manipulation 
of wait time data within the VA – most of 
which are currently ongoing. Even worse, 
as the scandal unfolded, it became clear 
that there were deep systemic and cultural 
problems that had existed for years within 
the VA health care system that made it 
more difficult for veterans to access their 
health care – despite massive funding 
increases that have nearly tripled the VA’s 
budget since 2001.
In response to the wait list scandal, Congress 
passed, and President Obama enacted, the 
Veterans Access, Choice and Accountability 
Act of 2014 (VACAA). VACAA made it 
easier to fire poorly-performing senior VA 
managers, created a temporary “Veteran 
Choice Card” that enabled certain eligible 
veterans to access private health care outside 
of the VA system, and provided additional 
funds to build more VA hospitals and hire 
more VA doctors. 
However, almost every lawmaker involved 
in crafting the VACAA—including the 
chairmen of the House and Senate VA 
committees—admitted that the $16.3 billion 
dollar bill was only a temporary fix that did 
not solve many of the systemic problems 
within the Veterans Health Administration. 
In particular, VACAA did not address the 
future demographic shifts in the veteran 
population that will make the current 
structure of the VHA more unsustainable 
than it already is. 
It is in this context that Concerned Veterans 
for America convened the Fixing Veterans 
Health Care Taskforce with the mission 
of isolating existing challenges to veterans’ 
health care, identifying systemic solutions, 
and proposing concrete reforms that would 
improve health care delivery for our nation’s 
veterans. It is the hope of CVA that the 
recommendations made in this report will 
dramatically improve health care access, 
timeliness, and outcomes for eligible veterans.
Even worse, as the scandal 
unfolded, it became clear 
that there were deep  
systemic and cultural  
problems that had existed  
for years within the VA  
health care system that  
made it more difficult for  
veterans to access their 
health care
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Scope of the Taskforce
CVA assembled a bipartisan group of 
health care experts, former VA leaders, and 
former congressional representatives to 
co-chair the Fixing Veterans Health Care 
Taskforce and to shape the Taskforce’s 
recommendations. The co-chairs were 
Dr. Bill Frist (R., Tenn.), a cardiothoracic 
surgeon who served as Senate Majority 
Leader from 2003 to 2007; former 
Congressman Jim Marshall (D., Ga.), 
a Purple Heart recipient and member of 
the 2014 National Defense Panel; Dr. Mike 
Kussman, Under Secretary for Health for 
the Veterans Health Administration from 
2006 to 2009; and Avik Roy, senior fellow 
at the Manhattan Institute’s Center for 
Medical Progress. The Taskforce executive 
director was Darin Selnick, who worked 
as a special assistant to the Secretary at the 
VA and also has experience working in the 
private health care industry. 
Through months of work and stakeholder 
consultations, the Taskforce’s lodestar 
remained constant: the system must focus on 
the health care needs of veterans, especially 
those with service-connected injuries. 
The co-chairs agreed to focus the Taskforce 
solely on veterans health care, in particular 
the VHA, instead of looking at a wider 
range of veterans’ benefits issues. For 
example, the Taskforce did not examine the 
veterans disability system, which like the 
VHA faces serious systemic problems, nor 
other benefit programs within the VA that 
are not related to veterans health care. 
The Taskforce emphasized the importance 
of seeking out the best possible set of 
fiscally and institutionally viable reforms: 
reforms that would assign highest priority 
to the interests of veterans. In addition, 
the Taskforce sought to develop a proposal 
with enough specificity—and with sufficient 
awareness of the tradeoffs inherent in any 
reform—that it could be effectively translated 
into congressional legislation.
CVA and the Taskforce sought extensive 
input from other stakeholders, including 
veterans organizations, VA employees, and 
policymakers. The participation of these 
entities and individuals further helped 
shape the Taskforce’s recommendations, 
and provided a deeper level of understanding 
of the systemic problems within the VHA. 
We believe that we have accomplished 
our mission of proposing specific reforms 
that will substantially address the systemic 
problems that have plagued veterans’ health 
care for years. 
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Procedures and
Methodologies
SUMMARY
SUBMISSION PORTAL
PROCESS
The Taskforce used multiple information-gathering methods. Research consisted 
of surveys, polling, roundtable discussions, expert briefings, interviews, and review of 
publications (i.e. government reports, university studies, and stakeholder reports). 
The information was then reviewed, synthesized, and briefed for review by the 
Taskforce. After reviewing all of the evidence, anecdotes, conjecture, and numbers, the 
Taskforce then submitted its recommendations to rigorous analysis and fiscal modeling. 
In order to obtain a better understanding of the challenges facing those who serve veterans 
and those who use the services for the veteran, Concerned Veterans for America solicited 
anonymous feedback regarding veterans’ health care appraisals and proposed 
improvements. CVA staff then reviewed and qualified over 1,400 responses. Data was 
classified into six focus areas including staff, service, access, benefits, choice, and 
privatization as well as the individual’s attitude towards each. All of this information 
was then reviewed, appraised, and discussed by the co-chairs and 
To inform the discussions, drafting, and thinking that shaped this report, the co-chairs 
and researchers gathered and reviewed an exhaustive list of documents pertaining to health 
care and veterans health care. This included a variety of organizational management 
documents, health care policy reports, comparative delivery model studies, CBO 
reports and congressional budgeting documentation. The insight lent by this literature 
review led to several group meetings and conference calls conducted by the co-chairs. 
At these meetings, a variety of witnesses and stakeholders offered information and 
advice. For example, participants included Dr. Sam Foote, the lead whistleblower at 
the Phoenix VA, and senior representatives of several veterans service organizations. 
Stakeholders responded to questions from Taskforce members and provided commentary 
regarding specific topics covered in this report. The questions, responses, and comments 
were noted and circulated for accuracy, then distributed for internal review and 
reflection. Any issues raised that required more context or research were delegated 
to CVA researchers for further review, briefing, and circulation. 
Members of the Taskforce calso onducted an in-depth analysis of the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats facing the VHA, in order to better evaluate 
the agency’s current structure and health care delivery system.  
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CVA INTERNAL SURVEY
FISCAL MODELING
In order to give proper weight to submission portal content and the broader health 
reform discussion, the Taskforce sought to further learn about how veterans consume 
health care. CVA circulated an internal survey pertaining to the type, frequency, and 
specialty of health services consumed. This survey also included duration of time 
between care and duration of time between scheduling and receipt of services. This 
information was internal to CVA members and completely voluntary. 
We retained the services of the Health Systems Innovation Network (HIS), led by 
University of Minnesota economist Stephen T. Parente, to assess the fiscal impact 
of the proposed reforms. HSI’s work began with initial research and base statistics 
and budgets to establish a baseline understanding of the economic environment 
surrounding veterans’ health care. Afterwards, HSI projected the cost of continuing 
the status quo for ten years and crafted another concurrent model using suggestions 
proffered by the Taskforce. These assumptions are explained in depth within this report. 
VETERANS’ NATIONAL SURVEY
Another information gathering effort was done via a formal poll conducted by the 
Tarrance Group. The poll circulated nationally over a nine-day period during which 
no relevant news cycle items received media attention. One thousand and five past or 
current members of the military were polled online or over the phone. This population 
was carefully selected to be representative of the broader demographics within the veteran 
population. Respondents were asked their opinion on the provision of health services to 
veterans, the impact of cost and choice, and various other factors impacting timeliness 
and cost of care. The poll informed the Taskforce of the appetite for reform and provided 
necessary insight into the thinking of current military affiliated health service consumers. 
3.  
THE MISSION OF
VETERANS’ HEALTH 
CARE: AN EVOLUTION
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The History
The United States has a long history of providing financial support and health care 
services to our nation’s veterans. It is a history intertwined with America’s earliest 
legal traditions. But the government’s precise responsibilities in this regard have 
evolved over time. The quality of the delivery of health care services to veterans has 
fluctuated. And the health care system in the broader United States has evolved 
significantly, especially in the last 70 years.
A review of the history of veterans’ health care, therefore, helps us assess how best 
to improve it.
PENSIONS FOR THE DISABLED
On May 31, 1776, the Continental Congress created a committee “to consider what 
provision ought to be made for such as are wounded or disabled in the land or sea service, 
and report a plan for that purpose.” John Adams declared, in a letter to a colleague, that 
“the equity and the policy of making provision for the unfortunate officer or soldier is 
extremely just.” Eight weeks after the Declaration of Independence, the Congress passed 
the nation’s first federal pension law, promising half pay for life to any officer, soldier, or 
sailor disabled in the service of the United States.
Despite repeated pleadings from General George Washington, the promise was not 
initially kept. When war ended in 1783, the fledgling federal government was drowning 
in debt. Instead of providing half pay for life, disabled veterans received interest-bearing 
“commutation certificates” whose cash value dwindled over time. 
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HOSPITALS FOR DISABLED VETERANS
As veterans returned home from World War I, veterans’ care underwent severe strain. 
In 1890, the U.S. Census recorded 1 million Union veterans. But 4.7 million Americans 
had been mobilized for World War I, from which 116,000 died and 204,000 returned 
home wounded. American involvement in the war had drawn up and down so quickly 
that the government could not adequately prepare. 
World War I made clear that veterans needed more than homes: They needed hospital 
care. The War Risk Insurance Act of 1917 provided federal financing for care of all 
service-connected injuries, whether through government-owned or private hospitals. 
Prior to that time, because voluntary (i.e., civilian) hospital3 beds were scarce, veterans 
needing hospital care received it from active duty military hospitals.
Furthermore, World War I veterans came home with two unusual health problems: 
tuberculosis, a malady that hadn’t afflicted American troops in previous conflicts and 
“shell shock,” a term coined because of the unprecedented use of artillery during the 
Great War. This latter war wound, now known as post traumatic stress syndrome 
(PTSD), previously had been little acknowledged or treated. 
But federal finances gradually stabilized. In 1828, President John Quincy Adams signed 
a law granting full pay for life to surviving veterans of the Revolutionary War, whether 
disabled or able-bodied. It was the first of many instances of the U.S. government 
expanding compensation beyond those with service-connected injuries.
OLD SOLDIERS’ HOMES
Congress expanded the scope of veterans benefits during the Civil War. In 1862, 
President Lincoln signed a law providing pensions not only to disabled veterans 
of past wars, but also to veterans of all future military actions undertaken by 
the United States, so long as the claimant could demonstrate that his disability was 
the direct consequence of his military duty. Lincoln used his second inaugural 
address to uphold the government’s role in providing care to disabled veterans:
With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right 
as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, 
to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the 
battle and for his widow, and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and 
cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.
In 1827, architect William Strickland was tasked by the U.S. Navy with making “the 
necessary contracts for materials, and superintend the building of a ‘permanent asylum 
for decrepit navy officers, seamen, and marines,’ at Philadelphia.”2 What became known 
as “old soldiers’ homes” proliferated after the Civil War, to care for disabled and elderly 
veterans, and the widows and orphans of those who died in battle.
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By this time, veterans’ financial and health care needs were being managed by five different 
government agencies: the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, the Public Health Service, the 
Federal Board of Vocational Education, the Bureau of Pensions, and the National Homes 
for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.
This set of problems—the sudden burst of wartime activity, the unique medical 
problems of World War I veterans, the uncoordinated and overlapping administration 
of veterans’ benefits; outdated civil-service laws, and the inherently slow-moving nature 
of government agencies—combined to renew outcry about the way veterans were 
treated after they came home.
In response, Congress established the U.S. Veterans Bureau in 1921. The new Bureau 
was designed to provide a single point of responsibility for health care for wounded 
and disabled veterans, consolidating the government’s risk insurance, public health, 
and vocational programs.
President Warren Harding appointed Col. Charles Forbes, a manager of a construction 
company in Washington state, to serve as the first director of the Veterans Bureau. The 
Bureau was assigned a substantial budget to build hospitals for veterans around the 
country, in order to ensure that soldiers and sailors would receive high quality health care.
Few of those hospitals were completed. A congressional investigation found that Forbes 
had massively overpaid for land to build veterans hospitals, and provisions to supply them, 
in exchange for kickbacks from landowners and manufacturers. The total taxpayer cost of 
Forbes’ waste, fraud, and abuse amounted to $200 million, or $2.8 billion in 2015 dollars.4 
He was sentenced to two years in Leavenworth Penitentiary.
HEALTH CARE FOR ALL VETERANS
President Herbert Hoover further consolidated veterans services in 1930, signing 
an executive order combining the Veterans’ Bureau, the Bureau of Pensions, and 
the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers into a new entity called the 
Veterans Administration. 
Under a new director, Frank Hines, and amidst complaints of overcrowding at existing 
veterans’ facilities, new hospitals were built. In 1921, there were 41 Veterans Bureau 
facilities; in 1925, there were 94; and by 1941, 149. The number of hospital beds rose 
from 10,655 in 1925 to 61,848 in 1941.5 
But as World War II drew to a close, it became clear that the new VA had overshot the 
problem of overcrowding, creating a new problem of overcapacity. Many VA hospital 
beds lay empty, consuming hundreds of millions of dollars in fixed operating costs. 
Moreover, a contemporary commission led by Herbert Hoover found that construction 
costs for the typical VA hospital ranged from $20,000 to $50,00 per bed, compared to 
approximately $16,000 per bed at voluntary hospitals.6
In an attempt to keep these beds filled, in 1966 Congress passed the Veterans Readjustment 
Benefits Act, expanding VA health care benefits to veterans without service-connected 
injuries, so long as veterans’ facilities had available space. Such a step had been taken 
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during the Depression, as a temporary measure. Now it was being done in a time of 
economic prosperity. By 2008, two-thirds of patients treated in the VA system did not 
have a service-connected disability.7
Gradually, Congress continued to expand the VA’s role in sponsoring health coverage. 
In 1973, Congress also authorized funding for outpatient care for veterans without 
service-connected disabilities. In addition, Congress created the Civilian Health and 
Medical Program of the Veterans Administration (CHAMPVA), a Medicare-like health 
insurance benefit for the spouses and children of veterans who were either disabled or 
dead due to a service-connected injury. In 1980, CHAMPVA was extended to spouses 
and children of members of the military who had died on active duty. Importantly, like 
Medicare, enrollees in CHAMPVA could seek care from private hospitals and physicians.
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REFOCUSING THE VA ON THE DISABLED
In 1986, Congress sought to reduce the trajectory of VA health spending, and refocus 
existing spending on those with service-connected injuries. Over the strenuous 
objections of some, Congress authorized the VA to contract veterans’ non-service-  
connected health care services to third-party insurers.8 Congress also required means- 
testing for VA treatment of non-service-connected disabilities, and also allowed the VA to 
introduce cost-sharing mechanisms for veterans with annual incomes above $20,000.9
For the first time, Congress established Priority Groups for the purpose of offering 
access to VA health care services. Category A, the highest-Priority Group, was 
reserved for veterans with service-connected disabilities, those eligible for a VA 
pension, former prisoners of war, Medicaid-eligible veterans, and other low-income 
veterans. Categories B and C encompassed higher income veterans without service- 
connected disabilities. Those in Category C were required to reimburse the VA for a 
portion of their health care expenses.
In 1996, Congress reorganized the Priority Groups into eight categories. Broadly 
speaking, Priority Groups 1, 2, and 3 are for veterans with service-connected disabilities; 
Priority Group 4 is for those with non-service-connected disabilities; Priority Groups 
5, 7, and 8 are for low-income able-bodied veterans; and Priority Group 6 is mostly for 
veterans of the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars.
The number of Veterans who can be enrolled in the health care program is determined by the amount of money Congress gives 
VA each year. Since funds are limited, VA set up Priority Groups to make sure that certain groups of Veterans are able to be 
enrolled before others.
PRIORITY 1
• Veterans with VA-rated service-connected disabilities 
  50% or more disabling
• Veterans determined by VA to be unemployable due 
  to service-connected conditions
PRIORITY 6
• Compensable 0% service-connected Veterans
• Veterans exposed to Ionizing Radiation during 
  atmospheric testing or during the occupation of 
  Hiroshima and Nagasaki
• Project 112/SHAD participants
• Veterans who served in the Republic of Vietnam 
  between January 9,1962 and May 7,1975
• Veterans of the Persian Gulf War that served between 
  August 2, 1990 and November 11, 1998
• Veterans who served on active duty at Camp Lejeune 
  for not fewer than 30 days beginning August 1, 1953 
  and ending December 31, 1987
• Veterans who served in a theater of combat operations 
  after November 11, 1998 as follows:
     Currently enrolled Veterans and new enrollees 
     who were discharged from active duty on or after 
     January 28, 2003, are eligible for the enhanced 
     benefits for 5 years post discharge
PRIORITY 2
• Veterans with VA-rated service-connected 
   disabilities 30% or 40% disabling
PRIORITY 3
• Veterans with VA-rated service-connected 
  disabilities 10% or 20% disabling
• Veterans who are Former Prisoners of War
•  Veterans awarded the Medal Of Honor (MOH)
• Veterans awarded a Purple Heart medal
• Veterans whose discharge was for a disability 
  that was incurred or aggravated in the line  
  of duty
•  Veterans awarded special eligibility 
   classification under Title 38, U.S.C., § 1151, 
   “benefits for individuals disabled by  
   treatment or vocational rehabilitation”
PRIORITY 4
• Veterans who are receiving aid and attendance 
  or housebound benefits from VA
• Veterans who have been determined by VA 
  to be catastrophically disabled
PRIORITY 7
• Veterans with gross household income below the 
   geographically-adjusted income limits (GMT) for 
   their resident location and who agree to pay copays
PRIORITY 5
• Nonservice-connected Veterans and non- 
  compensable service-connected Veterans rated 
  0% disabled by VA with annual income below the 
  VA’s and geographically (based on your resident 
  zip code) adjusted income limits.
• Veterans receiving VA pension benefits
• Veterans eligible for Medicaid programs
PRIORITY 8
• Veterans with gross household income above the 
VA and the geographically-adjusted income limits 
for their resident location and who agrees to pay 
copays
• Veterans eligible for enrollment: 
       –Noncompensable 0% service-connected
       –Nonservice-connected
• Veterans not eligible for enrollment: 
       –Veterans not meeting the criteria above
Priority Groups Table
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THE ACA EXPANDS FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Today, veterans receive health care services from a variety of sources, including the 
VA, Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers. These methods of delivering health 
care services more or less evolved independently, creating an inefficient patchwork of 
overlapping federal policies- a problem that the VA has been attempting to address 
for nearly 100 years. 
In 2008, according to VA estimates, veterans enrolled in the VHA received an average 
of 77 percent of their health care services outside of the VA system.10 11 The combination 
of Medicare, Medicaid, and an expanded VA increased the expectation that the 
government would take a role in subsidizing health care spending for all Americans 
in need, an expectation that culminated in the controversial passage of the Affordable 
Care Act in 2010.
The ACA, often called “Obamacare,” expands the Medicaid program to all able-bod-
ied and disabled adults with incomes below 138 percent of the Federal Poverty Level 
(FPL). The law also offers tax credits to those with incomes below 400 percent of FPL 
to defray the cost of purchasing regulated private insurance products.
77%
In 2008, veterans enrolled in the VHA, 
on average, received their health care 
services outside of the VA system10
COST-SHARING AND THE VHA
The near-absence of cost-sharing in the VHA has superficial appeal, because it 
minimizes the financial contribution required from eligible veterans. However, there 
is no such thing as a free lunch in health care. Health systems that offer coverage that is 
free at the point of service commonly ration access to care in order to contain costs. For 
example, in the British National Health Service—a system similar in structure to the 
VHA—the average wait time for a knee replacement is twelve months, compared to 
three to four weeks in the United States.12 In the Medicaid program, where cost-sharing 
is similarly constrained, access to needed care is a serious and chronic problem.13 
Similarly, waiting lists and delayed access are among the most common complaints of 
VHA enrollees.
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Economists and actuaries recognize that cost-sharing is a critical tool for managing 
the overall cost of health care, by giving patients an incentive to avoid unnecessary 
services. “Cost-sharing, if done appropriately, can slow the growth of health spending,” 
notes health economist Alan Garber, the provost of Harvard.14 Indeed, at any given 
level of expenditures, the operational efficiencies resulting from cost-sharing would 
allow a larger population of veterans to gain faster, more affordable coverage.
Cost-sharing has been nearly universally embraced in the private insurance market, 
because of its utility in offering beneficiaries the broadest access to health care at the 
lowest price.
CONCLUSIONS
As is evident from the above discussion, federal responsibilities for veterans health care 
have evolved substantially since America’s founding. Initially, veterans assistance took 
the form of direct financial aid for disabled veterans. Over time, Congress authorized 
spending on long-term care facilities, hospitals, and outpatient clinics. Congress also 
expanded health coverage to veterans without service-connected injuries.
The irregular expansion and evolution of the VA’s role has been due to several factors. 
First, the VA and its predecessor agencies were tasked with offering hospital care and 
other resource-intensive services at a time when the civilian hospital infrastructure was 
sparse. Second, the timing and the scale of war over the centuries has been sporadic and 
unpredictable, leading to a boom-and-bust cycle of VA utilization. Third, technological 
advances have altered the set of health care issues encountered by veterans of different eras.
Given the dramatic improvement in private sector health care in the United States in the 
last 70 years, it is clear that the delivery of veterans’ health coverage in the twenty-first 
century would improve substantially if veterans could obtain health care services in the 
most flexible manner possible.
Veterans’ health coverage in the 21st century would 
improve substantially if veterans could obtain health 
care services in the most flexible manner possible.
4.  
CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES
IN VETERANS’ 
HEALTH CARE
The Challenges of
Veterans Health Care
The Veterans Health Administration is the largest non-Defense 
employer within the federal government, with approximately 
275,000 employees. These employees are dedicated public servants, 
many of whom are passionate in the service of the veteran 
population. However, throughout the history of the VA, there 
have been complaints about the quality of care at VA facilities. The 
similarity of these criticisms over time, spanning many different 
eras in American history, require some reflection.
As discussed above, the commitment of the federal government to 
hospital care for veterans emerged after World War I. Almost right 
away, there were complaints about the conditions at veterans’ facilities.
In 1921, one witness told a Senate committee that care for veterans 
with tuberculosis and psychiatric conditions had become “so wholly 
inadequate as to amount to practically nothing.” In addition, veterans 
faced substantial delays in receiving compensation for hospital care, 
with one senator charging that veterans were being cared for by 
“incompetent political doctors” in the Public Health Service, political 
appointees rather than meritocratic ones.15
Driven by these concerns, Congress folded the veterans portion 
of the Public Health Service into the new Veterans Bureau. But 
the Charles Forbes corruption scandals, driven in large part by 
waste, fraud, and abuse in the construction of veterans hospitals, 
led to a second round of consolidation in 1930, and the formation 
of the Veterans Administration.
Bureau officials did strive to improve the quality of veterans 
health care. In 1925, Frank Hines prompted collaboration with 
the American College of Surgeons to improve the performance of 
veterans hospitals.16 The Bureau established a section on medical 
research, and set up two residency programs for training in the 
neuropsychiatric disorders common among World War I veterans. 
“However,” notes Ronald Hamowy of the Independent Institute,  
“widespread criticism of the quality of medical care accorded 
veterans continued through the 1930s and 1940s Complaints 
during this period were most often directed at the quality of medical 
facilities and at the poor qualifications of VA personnel.”17
CONTROVERSIES AFTER 1945
World War II introduced an even larger generation of veterans—
nearly 20 million—into the VA system. Once again, observers 
began to complain of inadequate conditions, describing veterans 
health care as “back waters of medicine” in “physical and scientific 
isolation.”18 Albert Maisel, writing in Readers’ Digest, decried the 
state of VA health care as “third rate treatment of first-rate men.”
Albert Maisel, Readers’ Digest
In every one of these hospitals that I have visited—from Minnesota 
to Massachusetts—I have found disgraceful and needless over-
crowding. I have found doctors overloaded and hog-tied by 
administrative restrictions…nurses [who] did not bother to wash 
their hands after examining one patient with a contagious disease 
before turning to another.
Then I have gone to many [civilian] state and county hospitals, 
just as tied down by government restrictions and labor shortages…
Here there are lower death rates and higher cure rates. That is why 
I know that there is no excuse for the Veterans’ Administrations’ 
third-rate treatment of first-rate men.19
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The Veterans Health Administration is the 
largest non-Defense employer within the  
federal government, with approximately 
275,000 employees.
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FROM 1944 TO 1946
In one of the first attempts at comparing VA health outcomes to 
those in voluntary hospitals, Maisel found that the civilian facilities 
were eleven times more effective than VA hospitals at treating 
tuberculosis. The VA categorized as “tuberculosis specialists” 
physicians with one year of internship and four months’ orientation, 
in contrast to the American Medical Association’s stricter standards 
for residencies in thoracic surgery or infectious diseases.
By this time—in part as a reaction to the Forbes-era scandals—
the Veterans Bureau had developed a thick layer of bureaucracy 
designed to prevent corruption and waste. “By 1949,” notes 
Hamowy, “the agency was operating under the authority accorded 
it by more than 300 laws, providing benefits to nearly 19,000,000 
living veterans and to dependents of deceased veterans,” amounting 
to approximately 40 percent of the adult U.S. population.
In 1945, New York Post columnist Albert Deutsch testified 
before Congress that Charles Forbes’ successor as VA director, 
Frank Hines, “placed excessive stress on paper work. Bureaucratic 
procedures were developed, which tied up the organization in 
needless red tape. Avoidance of scandal became the main guide 
of official action. Anything new was discouraged: ‘It might get us 
into trouble.’ Routineers and mediocrities rose to high office by 
simple process of not disturbing the status quo. Good men were 
frozen out or quit.”20
In response to these concerns, in 1946 President Harry Truman 
replaced Hines with Gen. Omar Bradley. In the two years following, 
the VA’s headcount went from 65,000 to over 200,000. Its annual 
budget increased from $744 million in 1944 to $7.5 billion in 1946.
The sudden expansion did relieve the problem of overcrowding in 
VA hospitals. But a federal commission led by former President 
Hoover found that the government was not planning its new 
hospital construction in a systemic fashion, but rather a political 
one. Hence, some areas had far too many hospital beds, and other 
areas too few; 81 percent of VA hospitals in the San Francisco 
Bay area were unoccupied, and 86 percent in the New York 
City area. The Hoover Commission recommended that the VA 
close 20 veterans hospitals and construct no new ones. These 
recommendations were ignored.21
Gen. Bradley did make consequential changes at the VA. Bradley 
created a Department of Medicine and Surgery within the VA, and 
severed the VA’s medical staff from the federal Civil Service, with 
all its restrictions and regulations. These two reforms significantly 
improved the quality of care in VA facilities, as the VA began to 
draw from the same labor pool as voluntary hospitals. 
Bradley’s Chief Medical Director, Paul Magnuson, established 
collaborations whereby medical schools would train their students 
and house officers at nearby VA hospitals. By 1959, almost half of 
VA hospitals were affiliated with academic institutions; nearly 
two-thirds of today’s U.S. doctors received some of their training 
in a VA facility.22
The VA’s headcount went from 65,000 to over 200,000. 
The annual budget increased from $744 million to $7.5 billion
A federal commission led by former  
President Hoover found that the 
government was not planning its new 
hospital construction in a systemic 
fashion, but rather a political one.
65K 200K+
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THE 1977 NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL REPORT
The quality of VA-based care for Vietnam veterans also received 
critical treatment in the press, in Congress, and in the memoirs of 
Vietnam veteran Ron Kovic, Born on the Fourth of July, published 
in 1976 and eventually adapted into a movie. 
Congress asked the National Research Council to form a blue- 
ribbon panel, organized by the National Academy of Sciences and 
led by Saul Farber of New York University, to study the VA’s health 
care operations. The Academy’s 313-page report, published in 1977, 
noted that the dramatic increase in the VA’s budget had not solved 
the perception of poor quality at VA facilities.
The panel found that the VA’s post-World War II emphasis on 
hospital construction had another unintended consequence: the 
substitution of inpatient hospital care for outpatient doctors’ office 
visits. The VA had comparatively few outpatient facilities but an 
excess of inpatient hospital beds. This led VA facilities to hospitalize 
veterans who would normally be treated in doctors’ offices, 
resulting in poorer outcomes and higher costs.
In addition, the VA’s excess hospital capacity led the agency 
to seek to expand the number of veterans eligible for VA care, 
leading to comparatively less emphasis on those with service- 
connected injuries.
Furthermore, the panel raised concerns about the “scarcity and 
geographic distribution of outpatient facilities,” finding that 
“only 36% [of veterans] lived within 30 minutes of a clinic.” In 
addition, the panel found that “there are strong indications that 
utilization of outpatient facilities is correlated with a hospital’s 
inpatient admission and retention policies more closely than with 
the medical needs of the patients who apply for care.”
In response to these and many other concerns, the panel 
recommended that veterans health care be integrated into the 
broader civilian health care system, one that had grown substantially 
since World War I. “VA policies and programs should be designed 
to permit the VA system ultimately to be phased in to the general 
delivery of health service in communities across the country,” by 
utilizing “third-party insurers, both private and governmental, 
wherever such coverage is available.” Veterans service organizations 
opposed these recommendations, and Congress did not take 
them up.
Without major structural changes, criticism of VA health 
outcomes and quality continued into the 1980s. In 1988, the 
Veterans Administration was elevated to a cabinet-level 
department called the Department of Veterans Affairs. The 
VA’s health care programs were consolidated into the Veterans 
Health Administration within this new department. 
However, cabinet status did not measurably improve the quality 
of VA health care. Meanwhile, the aging of the World War II 
population meant that the veteran population was declining in 
size; in addition, as the U.S. population moved south and west, 
older VA facilities in the northeast were further underutilized, 
while VA hospitals in the younger parts of the country faced 
overcrowding.23 In the New York Times, fiscal scholar Richard 
Cogan said, “The real question is whether there should be a 
veterans health care system at all.”24
The panel recommended that veterans’ health care be integrated into the broader civilian 
health care system, one that had grown substantially since World War I.
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THE KIZER ERA, 1994-1999
THE SCANDALS OF 2014
An instructive bright spot for the VA emerged in 1994, when 
President Bill Clinton appointed Kenneth Kizer of the University 
of Southern California as Under Secretary for Health in the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. “There was universal consensus,” 
Kizer told Phillip Longman, “that if there was one agency that 
was the most politically hidebound and sclerotic, it’s the VA.” But 
where others saw sclerosis, Kizer saw opportunity. “The basic 
thesis…was that we have to be able to demonstrate that we have 
equal or better value than the private sector, or frankly we should 
not exist.”25
Kizer introduced a substantial restructuring of the VA’s operations, 
despite considerable internal resistance.26  Kizer closed more than 
half of the VA’s hospital beds between 1994 and 1998, emphasizing 
outpatient physician care over hospitalization. As a result, inpatient 
hospital admissions declined by 31 percent, and the number of 
hospitalization days decreased from 3,530 per 1,000 patients in 1995 
to 1,333 in 1998: a drop of 62 percent.27
In the 1970s, a group of entrepreneurial employees at the VA 
began secretly developing an early version of electronic patient 
records. Their effort was intensely resisted by the VA’s leadership 
in the 1970s and 1980s, but the entrepreneurs eventually prevailed, 
establishing a free, open-source system called Veterans Health 
Information Systems and Technology Architecture, or Vist A.
Kizer reorganized the VA around Veterans Integrated Service 
Networks, or VISNs, to improve the coordination of care that 
veterans received. He deployed VistA and other modern tools to 
ensure that veterans were receiving care based on the best available 
scientific evidence. 
Research by Kizer and others indicated that by the late 1990s, the 
VA was engaging in evidence-based medicine—such as providing 
aspirin to heart attack victims after they left the hospital—at 
higher rates than the Medicare program, which worked mostly 
through voluntary hospitals.28 One comparison of diabetic care at 
five VA medical centers to their commercially-insured counterparts 
suggested that the VA patients enjoyed better rates of blood glucose 
and cholesterol management.29 
While these studies were limited in scope, they represented the first 
meaningful instances of research indicating that VA health care 
could be the equal of private health care on some quality measures. 
In 2007, Philip Longman published a book entitled Best Care 
Anywhere, arguing not merely that VA health care was no longer 
inferior, but that the VA was the model that the rest of American 
health care should follow.
Kenneth Kizer stepped down as director of the Veterans Health 
Administration in 1999. In the ensuing years, problems once 
again began to crop up with the delivery of VA care. “Since 2005, 
the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) has issued 18 reports 
that identified, both at the national and local levels, deficiencies 
in scheduling resulting in lengthy waiting times and the negative 
impact on patient care,” noted the VA’s Acting Inspector General 
in a 2014 review.30
A 2013 investigation by CNBC revealed widespread problems 
with unsanitary conditions inVA medical facilities. In addition, 
CNBC found evidence that VA officials were distorting autopsies 
and medical records in order to make the VA’s clinical performance 
look better than it actually was.31
In 2014, a constellation of scandals were simultaneously reported 
in the media. Some VA employees were misrepresenting their 
facilities’ performance under the metrics that Kizer had installed, 
in order to gain cash bonuses. Administrators at more than 26 
VA facilities, including the hospitals in Phoenix, Austin, San 
Antonio, Durham, St. Louis, and Chicago, were found to be 
manipulating waiting lists so as to present the impression that 
veterans were receiving timely care, when they were not.32
In retrospect, while the VA did improve the delivery of care at its 
facilities during Kizer’s tenure, those improvements were more 
temporary than many had hoped. “VA officials have not 
been as closely focused on data, results, and 
metrics—performance measurement—as they 
once were,” Kizer told the New York Times 
in 2014. “The culture of the VA has become 
rather toxic, intolerant of dissenting views and 
contradictory opinions. They have lost their 
commitment to transparency.”33
In addition, the accuracy of VA clinical outcomes data is left in 
doubt by widespread evidence that VA officials manipulated patient 
record-keeping in order to gain performance bonuses, including 
“clinically significant delays in care associated with access to care.”34 35
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THE VETERANS ACCESS, CHOICES, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2014
In response to deaths at the Phoenix VA due to delayed medical 
care, and the revelations of secret waitlists, Congress in 2014 passed 
the Veterans Access, Choice and Accountability Act of 2014 
(VACAA). The bill rests on three major initiatives: (1) allowing 
veterans to seek care outside VA facilities if they can demonstrate 
that they have waited for a specified period or live far from a VA 
facility; (2) expanding the VA’s internal capacity to provide care; 
and (3) enabling the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to fire Senior 
Executive Service employees for poor performance and misconduct.
However, it is not clear whether or not the VA will be able to 
successfully implement the changes mandated by VACAA. During 
a hearing on VACAA implementation, James Tuchschmidt, Acting 
Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Health for the Veterans 
Health Administration, expressed skepticism:
     What the [VACAA] program has done—and we are having 
     discussions right now, quite frankly, that are, for many people,  
     very anxiety-producing, that our future is not about being a 
     provider organization only. We are now entering a realm  
     where we, quite frankly, are running a health plan, where the 
     veteran, the patient decides what happens to them, and where 
     they go, and how they get care, and what care they get. And  
     this is a huge cultural shakeup, quite frankly, for us as an 
     organization.36
While offering veterans the ability to decide “what happens to 
them, and where they go, and how they get care, and what care 
they get” is a desirable goal, there is limited evidence that the VA 
will be able to achieve that goal within its existing configuration.
Furthermore, the provisions of VACAA that assist veterans in 
obtaining health care outside of the VA system are of limited 
duration. Congress appropriated $15 billion under VACAA for 
the purpose of offering veterans health care through non-VA 
entities; the Congressional Budget Office projects that the bulk 
of these funds will be used up by the end of the 2016 fiscal year.
Hence, this Congress or the next one will likely be faced with the 
unattractive and costly option of temporarily renewing VACAA 
for a few more years, or enacting a permanent, long-term solution 
that improves access to care for veterans in a strategically sound 
and fiscally responsible manner.
In retrospect, while the VA did improve the delivery of care at its facilities during Kizer’s tenure, 
those improvements were more temporary than many had hoped.
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THE VA’S PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS
In this section, we have noted many of the instances where veterans’ 
health care has fallen short. But it is just as important to note the 
many scientific and medical innovations that have been pioneered 
by VA researchers and clinicians. “VA’s accomplishments on all 
three pillars”—health care research, training, and delivery—are 
“broad [and] historically significant,” wrote VA Secretary Robert 
McDonald in a 2014 editorial: 
VA is affiliated with over 1,800 educational 
institutions providing powerful teaching 
and research opportunities. And our 
research initiatives, outcomes and honors 
are tremendous. Few understand that VA 
medical professionals:
• Pioneered and developed modern electronic medical 
  records
• Developed the implantable cardiac pacemaker
• Conducted the first successful liver transplants
• Created the nicotine patch to help smokers quit
• Crafted artificial limbs that move naturally when  
  stimulated by electrical brain impulses
• Demonstrated that patients with total paralysis could 
  control robotic arms using only their thoughts—a  
  evolutionary system called “Braingate”
• Identified genetic risk factors for schizophrenia,  
  Alzheimer’s and Werner’s syndrome, among others
• Applied bar-code software for administering medications 
  to patients—the initiative of a VA nurse
• Proved that one aspirin a day reduced by half the rate 
  of death and nonfatal heart attacks in patients with   
  unstable angina
• Received three Nobel Prizes in medicine or physiology 
• Seven prestigious Lasker Awards, presented to people 
  who make major contributions to medical science or 
  public service on behalf of medicine
• Two of the eight 2014 Samuel J. Heyman Service to 
  America medals37
While these past accomplishments are indeed impressive, it is 
incumbent upon us to focus on the best way to improve the quality 
of health care for today’s veterans, and how best to ensure that the 
VA is best positioned to provide high quality health coverage and 
care in the decades to come.
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The problems identified by the Office of Inspector General in 
2014—revolving around the VA’s bureaucratic tendencies and the 
impact thereof on patient care—are not new problems; indeed, 
complaints of this nature run through nearly the entire history of 
federally-run veterans’ hospitals. An undeniable thread of  “reform 
and failure” runs through the history of veterans’ health care.
The VA has served an important role in offering health care services 
to veterans, especially those with service-connected disabilities and 
those without the means to afford private health coverage. The VA’s 
involvement in long-term care for injured veterans dates back to the 
nineteenth century, and it is a role that fulfills a real need, given the 
woefully thin private market for long-term care insurance.38
However, it is unclear why veterans should be denied the opportunity 
to seek care outside the VA system, if that is what they wish to do. 
Indeed, the VHA itself estimates that veterans enrolled in the VA 
health care system receive three-quarters of their care outside of 
the VA.39
VA care may remain the equal of private care, for only those who 
manage to get in the door. This is, of course, a subject of vigorous 
debate. But the comparison of VA care to private care is not 
meaningful if veterans have to wait for months, or even years, 
to see a doctor.
In 1921, when the Veterans Bureau was created, 
civilian health care infrastructure was sparse. 
Today, the U.S. has the most developed health 
care infrastructure in the world; U.S. health 
care spending represents more than 17 percent 
of the nation’s economic output.40 There is no 
legitimate reason for veterans to wait in line for 
access to health care, when there are so many 
ways for veterans to gain that access, if they are 
given the means to do so.
THE DEMOGRAPHIC UNSUSTAINABILITY 
OF TODAY’S VHA
If Congress does not soon enact proactive and fundamental reforms 
of the VA, demographic realities will force changes that are more 
drastic and reactionary than those proposed today.  As the Vietnam 
THE IMPEDIMENTS TO VETERANS’ 
HEALTH CARE REFORM
As discussed above, past efforts at improving veterans’ health care 
have faced enormous resistance from a constellation of forces 
sometimes described as the “Iron Triangle.”
“The VA and its advocates,” wrote John K. Iglehart of the New 
England Journal of Medicine in 1985, “represent a classic example 
of an ‘iron triangle’ of interests that make their way through the 
Washington policy swirl. In this instance, the triangle consists of 
the agency itself, the congressional committees that oversee and 
often protect its interests, and veterans’ service organizations, 
many of which operate under a federal charter…The interlocking 
nature of this influential triad is well reflected by the movement 
of numerous staff members between its organizations.”41
generation passes on, the size of the veteran population will shrink 
considerably. In 2009, there were 24 million U.S. veterans; by 2029, 
the VA expects that population to shrink to 16 million. 
The number of VHA enrollees, while older in age, will shrink 
as well. Advances in medical technology have also led to fewer 
hospitalizations and more care delivered in physician offices. 
Future wars could, of course, re-expand the veteran population, 
but this is not a possibility that the VHA can either predict or rely 
upon. Simply put, the VHA must get ahead of its demographic 
destiny, or be overcome by it.
We believe there are two choices in confronting this challenge. On 
the one hand, we could advance incremental reforms to the current 
system, leading to incremental improvements in the near term. But 
this course would not empower veterans to choose the health care 
best for them, and would ignore looming demographic realties. On 
the other hand, we could advance long-term reforms of the current 
system, while addressing the immediate needs of veterans, and in 
doing so, give veterans control over their own health care, improve 
the sustainability of VHA facilities for the long haul, and break 
the government cycle of reform and failure.
We enthusiastically choose the latter option. Now is the time to 
ensure that veterans—young and old, male and female, rich and 
poor, urban and rural—are the centerpiece of veterans’ health care. 
For too long, concerns unique to the VHA as a legacy institution 
have distorted the planning, funding and delivery of health care for 
veterans. While the VHA will remain an important component of 
veterans’ health care delivery, we firmly believe that veterans’ interests 
must take precedence.
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 IGLEHART’S TRIANGLE
…The interlocking nature of this influential triad 
is well reflected by the movement of numerous 
staff members between its organizations.”41
The VA’s long history of political decision-making and bureaucratic 
management is the direct result of the uninterrupted dominance 
of Iglehart’s Iron Triangle. Career senior managers at the Veterans 
Health Administration are often hampered by VA political 
appointees with significant variability in tenure, background, and 
management skills—many of whom have little-to-no health care 
experience. All comparable health care systems in the private sector 
have professional leadership, board oversight, well-established 
succession plans, and the ability to make relatively rapid decisions.
For example, the politicization of VA hospital construction—a 
problem that goes back to Charles Forbes and the 1920s—continues 
to hamper the delivery of veterans health care. The most high profile 
current example is the construction of a VA hospital in Aurora, 
Colorado, which has come under scrutiny for its numerous delays 
tied to cost. The initial approved budget for the hospital was listed at 
$604 million, but has now ballooned to over $1 billion and is years 
behind its original completion date. Contract disputes between 
the contractor and government became so strained recently that it 
led to a brief work stoppage in December.42 The U.S. Government 
Accountability Office found similar problems in Las Vegas, New 
Orleans, and Orlando, with cost overruns of nearly $1.5 billion.43
Each corner of Iglehart’s triangle has its own incentives to oppose 
VA reform. VA facilities employ thousands of individuals in certain 
congressional districts; elected officials oppose the closure of VA 
A system in which veterans can choose for themselves how to 
allocate their health care resources will be inherently more responsive 
to veterans’ needs than one in which decisions are made by a 
confluence of Washington interests. However, some of the nation’s 
oldest veterans organizations have been adamantly opposed to 
such reforms.
The prestige of certain veterans’ organizations, combined with 
their skepticism of reform, has had a major impact on Congress. 
Lawmakers understandably value the policy endorsements of 
veterans organizations. Indeed, in the recent past, some veterans 
organizations have been able to review proposed budgets for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, both from the White House 
and Congress, prior to the introduction of fiscal legislation.44
We believe that veterans’ organization are mistaken if they see for 
themselves a diminished role if individual veterans are empowered 
to access and manage their own care in the private market. Indeed, 
the opposite is true; if veterans have a broader range of health care 
choices, they will actively seek guidance from traditional veterans’ 
organizations in navigating those choices.
Most importantly, the vast majority of rank-and-file veterans want 
those choices.
We believe that veterans’ organization 
are mistaken if they see for themselves a 
diminished role if individual veterans are 
empowered to access and manage their 
own care in the private market. Indeed, 
the opposite is true; if veterans have a 
broader range of health care choices, 
they will actively seek guidance from 
traditional veterans’ organizations in  
navigating those choices.
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VETERANS’ OPINIONS ON VA REFORM
The VA’s flawed survey methodologies
The VA frequently reports that it delivers satisfactory care. The 
VA has employed the American Customer Satisfaction Index as 
a survey tool; the ACSI has ranked VA health care as being on 
par with many of the most prestigious hospital systems in the 
United States. However, the ASCI’s survey methods are somewhat 
misleading. They do not attempt to measure the problems of access 
to care that drive many veterans away from the VA. Nor do they 
measure the views of those who do not utilize VA services because 
of their poor experiences.45
In December 2014, the Congressional Budget Office identified 
federal ownership of the VHA as a likely hindrance of higher 
quality care, observing that “regulations that govern the hiring 
and firing of federal employees probably make it harder for VHA 
to deal with personnel who do not perform at expected levels.”46
There is considerable evidence that poor employee morale leads 
to declines in the quality of customer service.47 According to the 
VA’s 2014 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, high-performing 
VA employees have low morale, in large part because they believe 
that they are treated no better than poorly performing workers. 
Seventy percent of respondents said that they do not believe that 
“in my work unit, steps are taken to deal with a poor performer 
who cannot or will not improve.”  Furthermore, less than 70 
percent of respondents believed that differences in performance 
were not recognized in a meaningful way, and that promotions 
were not based on merit.48 
The survey also found that over 60 percent of VA employees that 
responded to the survey do not believe that staff awards depend 
on how well employees perform at their jobs. Close to 60 percent 
of survey respondents also believe employees are not recognized 
for providing high quality products and services. Another important 
finding was that close to 80 percent of VA employees that responded 
to the survey indicated that pay raises do not depend on how well 
employees perform their jobs.
According to the VA’s 2014 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, 
high-performing VA employees have low morale, in large part 
because they believe that they are treated no better than poorly 
performing workers. Seventy percent of respondents said that 
they do not believe that “in my work unit, steps are taken to deal 
with a poor performer who cannot or will not improve.” 
CVA NATIONAL SURVEY OF VETERANS
Veterans Want Choice
In November 2014, Concerned Veterans for America, in 
collaboration with The Tarrance Group, conducted a national 
survey of 1,005 veterans, active duty military, reservists, and 
members of the National Guard. Forty-eight percent of those 
surveyed had served in Vietnam, 21 percent in the conflicts in 
Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
Ninety percent of respondents favored “efforts to reform veteran 
health care in this country,” with 72 percent strongly in favor. 
Eighty percent of respondents described VA reform as “extremely 
important” or “very important,” with an additional 14 percent 
describing reform as “somewhat important.”
Fifty percent of respondents—including 60 percent of those who 
use VA facilities primarily—said that they had experienced the 
problem of excessive appointment wait times. More than a third 
complained of excessive travel times to appointments. Thirty-one 
percent complained of poor service. Seventy-four percent said 
“government bureaucracy” was the biggest source of problems at 
the VA.
Eighty-nine percent of veterans believed that it was “extremely 
important” or “very important” to increase health care choices 
for veterans. Eighty-eight percent agreed that eligible veterans 
should be given the choice to receive medical care from any source 
that they themselves choose. 
Veterans Thoughts
On Reforming
Veterans Health Care
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Surveyed choices included ensuring that veterans get the best possible care, even if 
that means getting that care outside a VA facility (95 percent believing this option 
to be “extremely” or “very important”); allowing veterans to go to the doctors or 
hospitals closest to their homes (91 percent); and allowing veterans to use a private 
physician if they choose (86 percent).
Strikingly, a large majority of veterans—77 percent—thought it “extremely” or “very 
important” to give veterans more choices in their insurance products, even if these 
alternatives involved higher out-of-pocket costs. Only six percent considered this 
option “not at all important.”
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VETERANS’ QUALITATIVE FEEDBACK
From September 29, 2014 to November 16, 2014, Concerned Veterans for America 
operated a portal whereby veterans could offer their feedback on the VA’s performance 
and on opportunities for reform. CVA received 1,473 entries to the portal, of which 1,254 
came from veterans. The submissions were sorted into six different issue categories that 
covered the spectrum of most of the suggestions received: staffing, service, access, 
benefits, choice, and privatization. 
Ninety-seven percent of received entries expressed negative impressions of the VA 
status quo, though this can be substantially explained by selection bias. Qualitative 
submissions largely discussed possible improvements in service (28 percent of responses), 
followed by improvements in staff (24 percent), and benefit reform (22 percent).
97%
of received entries expressed 
negative impressions of the VA 
status quo
5.  
TEN PRINCIPLES FOR 
VETERANS’ HEALTH 
CARE REFORM
Ten Principles For Veterans’ 
Health Care Reform
The institutional priorities of the VHA weigh too heavily in current planning, funding 
and care delivery decisions. We believe the interests of veterans should be paramount.
THE VETERAN MUST COME FIRST, NOT THE VA.1.
Veterans with service-connected disabilities and specialized health care needs should 
be heavily prioritized; any reforms should ensure VHA health care delivery centers 
on service-connected veterans and leveraging the VHA’s comparative advantage in 
specialized areas. Health care for America’s veterans should be earned either through a 
service-connect disability or military retirement based on a certain length of honorable 
service–it is an not, as some misrepresent it to be, an automatic entitlement for everyone 
who served. 
REFOCUS ON, AND PRIORITIZE, VETERANS WITH SERVICE- 
CONNECTED DISABILITIES AND SPECIALIZED NEEDS. 
2.
Those veterans who choose to use VHA facilities should receive timely and quality care. 
In order to achieve this goal, the VHA should be restructured—as an independent, 
efficient, and modern organization—that can compete with private providers.
THE VHA SHOULD BE IMPROVED, AND THEREBY PRESERVED.3.
Veterans should have the option to seek care outside of VA system but current enrollees 
who wish to continue to receive care within the system should retain the option to do so. 
Currently enrolled veterans will also have the option to “opt-in” to the reformed system.
GRANDFATHER CURRENT ENROLLEES. 4.
Reforming veterans health care is no easy task. Government 
agencies are famously resistant to reform. Even among these 
institutions, however, the VA is an especially challenging case, 
given the policy complexities of the VA’s interaction with the 
broader health care system, and the resistance of older veterans 
service organizations to previous attempts at reform.
It is, therefore, of particular importance to articulate a set of 
principles that can guide a substantial reform effort. 
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The VHA must be reformed now, or veterans’ demographics will force difficult—and 
inevitable—changes in the future. Any reform proposal must consider substantial 
forthcoming demographic shifts in the veteran population, including substantial shrinkage 
in overall numbers—save for another protracted conflict—and disproportionate 
decreases in future enrollment.
ADDRESS VETERANS’ DEMOGRAPHIC INEVITABILITIES. 7.
Minor tweaks to the current system may incrementally improve health care in the 
near term, but the monopolistic VHA bureaucracy is likely to return to a standard 
operating procedure heavily influenced by the desires and concerns of the institution and 
its employees. Only fundamental reform will break the cycle and empower veterans.
BREAK VHA’S CYCLE OF “REFORM AND FAILURE.” 8.
The VHA must be accountable to both veterans and taxpayers for its performance. 
An independent VHA will have more latitude to reward high performers, fire poor 
performers, and monitor the quality of health care delivery.
VHA NEEDS ACCOUNTABILITY. 10.
Based on eligibility, veterans should have the option to take their earned health care funds 
and use them to access care at the VA or in the voluntary (civilian) health care system. 
Because private health care is somewhat costlier than VHA-based care, most veterans 
who choose this option will be expected to share in some of the costs of such care, 
through co-pays and deductibles.
VETERANS SHOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE WHERE TO 
GET THEIR HEALTH CARE. 
5.
More efficient health care for our veterans may reduce the cost of their care, but 
reform should not be viewed as an avenue to reduce federal spending. Conversely, 
increased funding is insufficient to address VHA’s deficiencies. Thankfully, our 
fiscal modeling suggests reform can be achieved in a revenue-neutral manner.
VETERANS’ HEALTH CARE REFORM SHOULD NOT BE
DRIVEN BY THE BUDGET. 
6.
A well-connected VA bureaucracy, parochial congressional concerns, and powerful 
outside groups frequently stifle difficult reforms across the government—and the same 
could happen with VHA reform.
IMPLEMENTING REFORM WILL REQUIRE BIPARTISAN VISION, 
COURAGE AND COMMITMENT. 
9.
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Chapter 5: Ten Principles For Veterans’ Health Care Reform
In order to achieve the principles discussed above, the Fixing 
Veterans Health Care Taskforce has developed the Veterans 
Independence Act (VIA). The aim of the VIA is to significantly 
improve the quality, convenience, and flexibility of veterans’ 
health care.
6.  
THE VETERANS
INDEPENDENCE
ACT: Transforming Veterans’ Health Care For The 21st Century
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Chapter 6: The Veterans Independence Act
The aim of the Taskforce’s reform proposal—the Veterans Independence Act—is to 
significantly improve the quality, convenience, and flexibility of veterans health care. It 
is designed to be aligned with the ten core principles described above. In this section 
of our report, we outline below how the VIA puts these principles into action.
I. A New Role for the Veterans
Health Administration
Some advocates of VA reform argue that the Veterans Health Administration 
should be dismantled altogether. “The medical component of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs needs to be abolished,” argues Col. Jack Jacobs (Ret.), a military 
analyst for NBC News.
     We need to shut the doors of the thousands of medical facilities that are failing to serve 
      our veterans…It makes no sense to have a parallel universe to take care of our veterans, 
      separate doctors, separate facilities, equipment and even protocols. There is no reason 
      that veterans who would otherwise wait for months to be seen at a VA health clinic 
     can’t be seen by private doctors, the same doctors who treat everyone else.49
We do not agree with this sentiment. Veterans should certainly have the option 
to seek care outside of the VA system. But many veterans have been well cared for 
at VA facilities, and those who wish to continue to receive care there should retain 
the option to do so.
A HEALTH CARE SYSTEM WORTH PRESERVING
The Veterans Health Administration is home to the United States’ largest integrated 
health care system, consisting of 150 medical centers, nearly 1,400 community-based 
outpatient clinics, community living centers, Vet Centers, and other facilities. 
As of fiscal year 2013, the number of patients served by the VHA included 5.8 million 
veterans and nearly 681,000 non-veterans, for a total of 6.5 million. Included in this 
number are more than 616,000 of our newest veterans from 
Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn. 
For fiscal year 2016, the VHA has requested congressional 
appropriations of $63.2 billion for medical care, including $3.2 
billion in collections, and seeks to employ nearly 304,000 
full-time workers.50
A significant part of the VHA budget is dedicated to maintaining its medical facilities. 
But the high fixed costs associated with maintaining unused VA hospital beds and other 
brick-and-mortar resources siphon off funds that could be used to improve the quality of 
veterans’ health coverage.
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Under the Veterans Independence Act, all VHA  
enrollees will be offered the choice to seek coverage 
and care outside of the traditional VHA system.
The dramatically shifting demographics of the 
U.S. veteran population require us to give VA 
hospitals and facilities the tools they need.
Furthermore, the profoundly inefficient distribution and scale of VA medical facilities 
serves veterans poorly. In some areas, VA medical facilities are scarce, forcing veterans 
to drive long distances to receive care. In other areas, VA medical facilities go largely 
unused, due to overcapacity and demographic shifts. These problems compound those 
related to long wait times and other access problems at VA providers.
As veterans from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam pass on, VHA patient volume 
will significantly decline. In 2009, there were 24 million American veterans; by 2029, 
the VA expects that population to shrink to 16 million. In part, the decline in the size 
of the veteran population is driven by the difference between the largely conscripted 
cohort from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, relative to the all-volunteer force 
fielded in more recent conflicts; on average, veterans from volunteer forces are healthier, 
wealthier, and less likely to need VHA assistance.
Furthermore, under the Veterans Independence Act, all VHA enrollees will be offered 
the choice to seek coverage and care outside of the traditional VHA system. This change 
would further reduce VHA patient volume, depending on the proportion of veterans who 
elected to seek care outside of VA facilities.
Either way—with or without reform of veterans’ health care—the dramatically shifting 
demographics of the U.S. veteran population require us to give VA hospitals and facilities 
the tools they need to best serve those who rely on them.
48
SEPARATING THE VA’S PROVIDER 
AND PAYOR FUNCTIONS
Some institutions, like California’s Kaiser Permanente, have successfully integrated 
a health insurer with a provider of medical services. The theoretical advantage of an 
integrated system is that hospitals have less incentive to charge higher prices, knowing 
that doing so would increase the cost of their insurance product.
However, it is far from clear that such a model is workable for a government agency 
like the Veterans Health Administration as it does not have the political independence 
necessary to make economically efficient decisions. Furthermore, an integrated system 
heavily restricts the ability of veterans to seek care in voluntary (i.e., civilian) hospitals 
and from private physicians.
Veterans should have a choice as to where they receive their health care. At the same time, 
Congress must provide the VHA with the flexibility to make independent operating 
decisions, free of excessive regulatory and political interference.
In order to best offer veterans the option of receiving care from private physicians, then, 
it is desirable—if not necessary—to separate the VA’s payor and provider functions into 
separate institutions. The Veterans Independence Act proposes to do so by dividing the 
VHA’s existing responsibilities into the Veterans Health Insurance Program (VHIP) 
and the Veterans Accountable Care Organization (VACO).
VHIP, a program office of the Veterans Health Administration, would administer 
the VA’s health insurance and premium support programs within the Department 
of Veterans Affairs. Over time, the purpose of VHIP would naturally evolve in the 
direction of subsidizing veterans’ health coverage, whether from private or public 
institutions, and maintaining a market for private health insurance plans that offer 
veterans the choice of voluntary and VA health care providers.
The Veterans Accountable Care Organization would encompass the VA’s brick-and- 
mortar health care facilities. The Veterans Independence Act proposes to establish 
the VACO as a non-profit government corporation that is fully separate from the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, along the lines of the National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation, which manages Amtrak.
The VHA would continue to administer the other programs currently under its purview, 
such as the domiciliary care, programs for homeless veterans, administering education 
and training for health care personnel, conducting health care research and providing 
contingency support for DoD and HHS during times of war or national emergency. 
The VHA could, of course, contract with VACO for execution of some or all of these 
programs, in whole or part. For example, at least in the short run, most domiciliary care 
will be provided on VACO owned and operated campuses and facilities.
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INTEGRATED, ACCOUNTABLE CARE
FOR VETERANS
Restructuring the VHA as a non-profit government corporation has been proposed 
before. In 1996, at the behest of Congress, the Department of Veterans Affairs published a 
report authored by the Klemm Analysis Group, the Lewin Group, and Arthur Andersen 
that investigated the feasibility of “transforming the Veterans Health Administration into 
a government corporation.” The authors concluded that either a government corporation 
or “performance-based organization” would enhance the ability of the VHA to carry out 
its core functions.51
In 2009, the Veterans Coalition formed a Commission on the Future for America’s 
Veterans, including Kenneth Kizer and former American Legion National Commander 
Ron Conley. This group proposed that Congress “establish a new entity with characteristics 
not unlike a federal government ‘not for profit’ corporation, called the Veterans’ Health 
Service” that would, among other things, “receive all assets of the VHA unencumbered 
with authority to use them in a manner that maximizes benefits to veterans.”52 The 
coalition’s proposal would have moved all of the VHA’s functions into the new 
corporation, not merely its provider facilities.
The Amtrak Model
There are several examples of corporations chartered and owned by the federal  
government. These corporations provide public services; however, unlike services provided 
directly by government agencies, chartered corporations are independent legal entities 
separate from the U.S. government. Government-chartered corporations often receive 
federal budgetary appropriations, but they can also have independent sources of revenue.
The most prominent example of a federally chartered corporation is the National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation (NRPC), which operates Amtrak. The construction 
of interstate highways and the emergence of air travel led to a steep decline in passenger 
rail ridership; by the late 1960s, most private intercity rail services were unprofitable. 
In order to avoid the possible collapse of the U.S. railroad industry, in 1970, President 
Nixon signed the Rail Passenger Service Act, which created the National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation.
While Amtrak continues to require federal subsidies—including $1.39 billion in 
congressional appropriations in 2014—the NRPC has succeeded in growing the 
passenger rail market. In 1972, Amtrak carried 15.8 million passengers; in 2014, it 
carried 30.9 million, with ticket revenues of $2.2 billion.53 
Because Amtrak receives congressional subsidies, it remains subject to oversight from 
Congress. But the NRPC has been able to invest in the heavily traversed Northeast 
Corridor between Washington and Boston, and to discontinue dozens of underused routes.
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE NEW VETERANS
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATION
Accountable Care Organizations
One of the principal problems with the delivery of health care in the United States is its 
uncoordinated nature. In particular, patients with multiple chronic conditions may be 
seeing multiple physicians who do not talk to each other, leading to overlapping 
prescriptions and, in some cases, dangerous mistakes. “Badly coordinated care, duplicated 
efforts, bungled handoffs, and failures to follow up result in too much care for some 
patients, too little care for others, and the wrong care for many,” observed Katherine 
Baicker and Helen Levy in 2013.
A number of health care systems–comprised of hospitals, outpatient physician clinics, and 
other facilities—have attempted to rectify this problem by using information technology 
and aligned financial incentives to coordinate care between different physicians and 
different treatment modalities.
Model practitioners of this approach—called “accountable care organizations”—include 
the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota; the Cleveland Clinic in Ohio; the Geisinger 
Health System in central Pennsylvania; and Intermountain Healthcare in Utah.55 
Central to the ACO approach is the use of primary care physicians, who serve as the 
primary coordinators of patient care.
The VA’s health care facilities, in many ways, already incorporate some of the concepts 
utilized by accountable care organizations. In 2013, the VA employed 5,100 primary 
care physicians.56 The VA’s hospitals and clinics are all owned by the same entity, and 
the VA’s VistA electronic medical records system has helped the VA coordinate care for 
veterans with multiple medical conditions. 
Hence, formally organizing VA provider facilities along the ACO model could help  
improve veteran patient care within the VA system, and give the VA a natural set of private- 
sector benchmarks with which to assess its progress in improving health care delivery.
There are numerous ways in which the Veterans Accountable Care Organization could 
rationalize its medical center capacity and improve its overall veterans’ integrated health 
care system. We received numerous suggestions from veterans, veterans’ relatives, and 
VA employees through our Fixing Veterans Health Care submission portal.
Focus on Areas of Expertise
Veterans with service-connected injuries have distinct health care issues; for example, 
a higher prevalence of traumatic brain injuries, spinal cord injuries, and post-traumatic 
stress disorder. The Veterans Accountable Care Organization should build centers of 
excellence around these disciplines to serve the needs of the veteran population. VHA 
might contract with VACO to provide much of its veterans’ specific medical research 
plus health care education and training at these centers of excellence. 
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Accountability and Transparency
In 2014, the Congressional Budget Office attempted to compare health care costs in 
the VA system with those in other U.S. health care systems. However, CBO noted 
that “comparing health care costs in the VHA system and the private sector is difficult 
partly because the Department of Veterans Affairs…has provided limited data to 
Congress and the public about its costs and operational performance.” 
The Veterans Accountable Care Organization should publicly report on all aspects of 
its operation, including quality, safety, patient experience, timeliness, and cost-effective-
ness, using standards similar to those in the Medicare Accountable Care Organization 
program. In addition, the VACO must have the authority to hire and fire employees in a 
manner consistent with that in the private sector.
Obtain Evaluations From External Consultants
Organizations like the Advisory Board and McKinsey help private hospitals consider 
ways to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of health care delivery. The Veterans 
Accountable Care Organization could avail itself of the same tools.
Rationalize medical center portfolio
We hope the independence of the Veterans Accountable Care Organization will enable 
it to freely rationalize and manage its facilities to most efficiently devote its resources to 
veterans’ care. If, in practice, it does not enjoy this freedom, the Veterans Independence 
Act will provide ongoing authority for the president to institute a medical center 
realignment procedure modeled after the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 
1990 (BRAC). Under BRAC, the president is empowered to appoint an independent 
nine-member panel whose recommendations for base closures become law, unless 
Congress formally passes a resolution objecting to those recommendations within 45 days.
Under this Medical Realignment and Closure (MRAC) process, the President would 
be empowered to appoint an independent nine-member panel whose recommendations 
for medical center closures become law, unless Congress formally passes a resolution 
objecting to those recommendations within 45 days. 
For example, there could be an automatic trigger, whereby medical center facilities 
which have, on average, filled less than 30 percent of their beds on an average daily 
basis over a five-year period would be reviewed by the MRAC panel.
Consider Admitting Civilian Patients
In the private sector, rising hospital consolidation has led to higher U.S. health care prices 
without evidence of improved quality.57 The Veterans Accountable Care Organization 
could consider opening up its under-utilized medical facilities to non-eligible veterans, the 
families of enrolled veterans, and even civilians in regions where VHIP-enrolled patient 
volume is low. 
This could help VA hospitals weather the decline in the veteran population, and 
also smooth the transition to a premium support model for veterans’ health insurance. 
Furthermore, it could increase provider competition in areas where the hospital market 
is highly concentrated, reducing system-wide hospital prices.
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Investment in Human Capital
The Veterans Accountable Care Organization should upgrade its employee development 
program so that VACO employees have the professional development, technical training, 
and management training they need to provide world-class health care to veterans. VACO 
must develop new ways to recruit and retain health care professions so as to ensure that 
VACO can compete with private hospitals and retain the best health care professionals. 
For example, VACO could consider expanding its postgraduate medical training program, 
and offer residents the opportunity to retire some of their educational debt in return for 
serving in VACO facilities.
Information Technology Upgrades
While the VistA electronic medical records system is rightly hailed as being innovative 
for its time, the VA is not taking advantage of common twenty-first century tools to 
improve veteran-centered health care. For example, veterans would be well served by the 
ability to book appointments online use smartphones and where clinically appropriate, 
access VACO physicians over the internet for consultations, i.e, utilize their services 
via telemedicine. Furthermore, as veterans continue to receive the majority of their care 
outside the VA system, it will be increasingly important for VistA to coordinate with 
electronic medical records systems common in the private sector.
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II.  Veteran-Centered Health Coverage
PUTTING VETERANS IN CHARGE OF THEIR
OWN HEALTH CARE DOLLARS
Under the VIA, veterans who are satisfied with their current VA health care would be 
able to maintain their use of existing benefits with no cost-sharing. Importantly, however, 
this would not be veterans’ only option.
The Veterans Independence Act offers veterans control of their own health care dollars. 
Specifically, veterans will be able to take the funds  spent on them through the VA 
system and use those funds to purchase private health coverage through a mechanism 
called premium support—a process similar to that used by VA employees to obtain 
health coverage. Medicare-eligible veterans would be able to use VA funds toward 
their premium costs and supplemental “Medigap” coverage. The new Veterans Health 
Insurance Program (VHIP) will manage the nuances of providing these subsidies, in 
particular, designing them to assure that the cost of all service-connected care is paid 
either directly or through appropriate premium supports. 
All veterans who purchase private health coverage in this manner would continue 
to be able to use VA facilities through insurance products that contract with the 
Veterans Affordable Care Organization. The Veterans Independence Act would create 
a mechanism to ensure that private payors contract with VACO for this purpose.
Veterans would be well served by the ability to 
book appointments online use smartphones.
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VHIP would set up a new program, called “VetsCare,” that could organize three new 
plan choices for veterans.  
   • VetsCare Federal: VetsCare Federal: Full access to the VACO integrated 
      health system.
   • VetsCare ChoiCe: Private health insurance financed through premium support 
      payments, with access to both the VACO and civilian health care providers.
   • VetsCare senior: Supplemental “Medigap” health coverage for Medicare 
      eligible veterans, with access to both the VACO and civilian health care providers.
The Bipartisan History of Premium Support
The term “premium support” was coined by two Democrats: Henry Aaron of the 
Brookings Institution, and Robert Reischauer, director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under President Bill Clinton. Premium support, they wrote in 1995, describes 
a system in which the government “would pay a defined sum toward the purchase of 
an insurance policy that provided a defined set of services. As with private insurance 
for the working population…plans could manage care in any of the ways now in use 
or that might arise in the future.”58
The Federal Employee Health Benefits Program, or FEHBP, is the oldest and most 
successful premium support program in the world. FEHBP was founded in 1959 to offer 
private health insurance to federal workers, including employees of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs. Today, approximately eight million individuals—four million federal 
employees and four million of their dependents—are enrolled in the program, at a 
projected annual cost of $49 billion in 2015.59
For 20 years, premium support has been part of the most consequential health reform 
proposals of both Democrats and Republicans. In 1995, Aaron and Reischauer proposed 
reforming the Medicare program by offering premium support payments to retirees to 
shop for the private health insurance plans of their choice.
The concept was further elaborated in 1999 by the National Bipartisan Commission 
on the Future of Medicare, led by Democratic Sen. John Breaux (La.) and Republican 
Rep. Bill Thomas (Calif.). The Commission, whose members included Dr. Bill Frist 
(R., Tenn.), recommended transitioning Medicare into a premium support system 
and adding prescription drug coverage to the program. In 2001, Sens. Breaux and 
Frist introduced two bills—the Medicare Preservation and Improvement Act, and 
the Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act—in order to advance the 
Commission’s ideas in Congress.61
The term “premium support” was coined by two 
Democrats: Henry Aaron of the Brookings Institution, 
and Robert Reischauer, director of the Congressional 
Budget Office under President Bill Clinton.
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A version of the latter bill was signed into law by President George W. Bush. That 
law, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, employed premium support to offer 
private prescription drug coverage to the Medicare-eligible population. A 2012 poll by 
the Healthcare Leadership Council found that 90 percent of seniors with Medicare 
drug coverage were satisfied with their plans.62 
Furthermore, the fiscal performance of the Medicare drug benefit has been outstanding. 
[use Figure 9 from Transcending Obamacare as an illustration] In 2006, the Medicare 
Trustees projected that 2013 Medicare Part D prescription drug spending would reach 
$127 billion. Actual 2013 Part D spending was only $72 billion: 43 percent below the 
projected level.63Private coverage in the broader Medicare program—known as Part C 
or “Medicare Advantage”—is nearing one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries, and more 
than half of new enrollees.
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 also uses premium support to expand health 
coverage to the uninsured. “We’ll do this by creating a new insurance exchange—a 
marketplace where individuals and small businesses will be able to shop for health 
insurance at competitive prices,” said President Obama in a 2009 address to Congress. 
“As one big group, these customers will have greater leverage to bargain with the insurance 
companies for better prices and quality coverage. This is how large companies and 
government employees get affordable insurance. It’s how everyone in this Congress gets 
affordable insurance. And it’s time to give every American the same opportunity that we 
give ourselves.”64
Non-Medicare-Eligible Veterans
For non-elderly veterans and those ineligible for Medicare, the Veterans Independence 
Act would direct VHIP to use the VHA’s Priority Group system to design the VetsCare 
Choice program. Under this system, higher Priority Groups would receive higher levels of 
premium support. The sample structure described below is one of many ways to design 
such a system-Congress could consider others.
In the hypothetical VetsCare Choice program that we modeled, veterans with serious 
service-connected disabilities—Priority Groups 1 and 2—could gain the option of 
receiving a subsidy equivalent to the price of purchasing “platinum” level private coverage 
with a 90 percent actuarial value; i.e., health insurance in which 90 percent of expected 
claims will be paid by the insurer. Members of Priority Group 1 who are 100 percent 
disabled would gain a subsidy equivalent to coverage with a 100 percent actuarial value; 
i.e., no cost-sharing.
Members of Priority Group 3 could gain the option of subsidy worth “gold” level private 
coverage; i.e., with an actuarial value of 80 percent. For these three groups, services 
delivered in VA facilities or by VA physicians would be covered at 100 percent, with no 
cost-sharing.
Those in Priority Group 4—veterans with non-service-connected disabilities—could 
also gain the option of a “gold” level coverage subsidy. Priority Groups 5 and 6 could 
gain the option of means-tested premium support for “silver” coverage with an actuarial 
value of 70 percent.65 For those currently enrolled, and therefore grandfathered into 
current system, Priority Groups 7 and 8 would gain the option of “Bronze” coverage 
with an actuarial value of 60 percent. Under the VIA, veterans who would fall under 
Priority Groups 7 and 8 under the current system, would no longer qualify for health 
care within the reformed VHA. 
These premium support payments would be means-tested along the following scale: 
veterans with annual incomes below 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Level would 
gain subsidies for premium costs above 2 percent of their income; those between 133 and 
150 percent of FPL would gain subsidies above 3 percent of income; 150-200 percent 
FPL, 4 percent of income; 200-250 percent FPL, 6.3 percent of income; 250-300 percent 
FPL, 8.05 percent of income; 300-400 percent FPL, 9.5 percent of income. 
Individuals with incomes below 250 percent of FPL would gain additional cost-sharing 
subsidies to defray co-pays and deductibles. These cost-sharing subsidies would be 
deposited in a health savings account owned by the veteran, such that the effective  
minimum actuarial value of their coverage would be as follows: for those between 0 and 
150 percent of FPL, 94 percent; 150 and 200 percent of FPL, 87 percent; 200 and 250 
percent of FPL, 73 percent.
Those with service-connected cognitive disabilities; i.e., who are clinically unable to use 
health savings accounts and related tools, would automatically remain in the traditional 
VA insurance program.
VA premium support payments could be benchmarked to the second-lowest-cost 
plan of comparable actuarial value available in the veteran’s residential area. Veterans 
would be able to deploy the VA-funded premium support benefit to purchase any 
insurance plan legally available in their state; however, the cash value of the premium 
support benefit will be based on the above formula. Veterans who prefer high-deductible 
coverage would gain the additional option of directing the remainder of their premium 
support benefit into an interest-bearing health savings account.
For the purpose of fiscally scoring our proposal, we modeled VetsCare Choice in the 
above configuration. That configuration conceives of a holistic insurance product; i.e., a 
veteran who is 30 percent disabled due to a service-connected injury would receive health 
coverage through VHIP for both his service-connected and non-service-connected health 
care needs. Today, the VHA makes some distinctions between these two categories.
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   Annual     below 133      133-150      150-200      200-250      250-300      300-400   Income
    % of              0-150%         150-200%       200-250%     FPL
   Gained     above 2%        above 3%     above 4%      6.3%            8.05%          9.5% Subsidies     
     Min.               94%                87%                  75%   Value       
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One limitation of the VetsCare Choice approach is that while VetsCare Federal plans 
require no cost-sharing, the vast majority of VetsCare Choice plans do, under the 
hypothetical structure we have described, if care is delivered outside of VHA facilities. 
(Under the VetsCare Choice structure proposed, care delivered within VHA facilities 
would involve no cost-sharing.) Veterans who strongly prefer plans with no cost-sharing 
may choose to remain in VetsCare Federal.
Congress could structure VetsCare Choice plans to require less cost-sharing; however, 
if they did so, more veterans would enroll in these plans, which would in turn increase 
VHA spending—at least in the near term.
Medicare-Eligible Veterans
In our modeled plan, veterans over the age of 65, and those who qualify for Medicare 
due to disability, would gain the option of deploying the funds they now receive through 
the Veterans Health Administration to defray the costs of Medicare premiums and 
supplemental coverage (“Medigap”), in a program called VetsCare Senior. For veterans 
born after 1960—i.e., those who will turn 65 in 2025—these benefits would be available 
for Priority Groups 1 through 6 only.
Future Veterans 
However VHIP decides to meet America’s core obligation to finance veterans’ 
service-connected health care needs, the Veterans Independence Act will provide 
that future eligible veterans would be entirely transitioned into the premium support 
system, so as to provide a clear path for integration of veterans’ health care into the 
broader health care system. For future veterans, new eligibility requirements would 
go into effect for those veterans who applied for enrollment after a predetermined 
cutoff date.
Eligibility for sponsored health coverage would be based on the current Priority Group 
requirements. However, veterans with service-connected disabilities—i.e., those in 
Priority Groups 1 through 3—would be even more highly prioritized with the most 
generous  coverage, minimal cost-sharing, and expedited access to VHA facilities. The 
program would also assist disadvantaged veterans, such as those in Priority Groups 4 
through 6. 
LONG-TERM CARE REFORM
Unlike acute-care insurance, which pays for hospital and other medical costs due to 
illness or injury, long-term care insurance is designed to finance the costs of care for 
individuals who can no longer perform everyday tasks—such as getting in and out 
of bed, getting dressed, or using the bathroom—without assistance. High quality 
long-term care is an important part of supporting veterans with service-connected 
health care needs.
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For various reasons, the U.S. market for private long-term care insurance is not robust. 
Partially this is due to the fact that the Medicaid program funds long-term care in such 
a way as to crowd out private insurers; more than 800,000 Americans are enrolled in 
Medicaid’s Managed Long-Term Services and Supports program (MLTSS).66 
The other major issue is that few younger individuals see the value in purchasing long-
term care insurance that they will likely not need until they are much older. Because 
mostly older and sicker people buy private long-term care insurance in the United States, 
average per-enrollee costs are high, and therefore average insurance premiums.
In 2000, Congress passed the Long-Term Care Security Act, which created a long-term 
care insurance program for federal and U.S. postal employees called the Federal 
Long Term Care Insurance Program (FLTCIP). Active and retired members of the 
uniformed services are eligible for FLTCIP, which is managed by the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management. 
From 2002 to 2009, private insurers John Hancock and MetLife formed a consortium 
to offer the FLTCIP’s insurance product; since 2009, John Hancock has been the 
sole insurer. In September 2013, more than 270,000 individuals were enrolled in the 
FLTCIP, making it the largest employer-sponsored long-term care insurance program 
in the United States.
The Veterans Independence Act would optimize long-term care for veterans by offering 
them the option of enrolling in the FLTCIP, or applying the equivalent premium support 
payment to the purchase of alternative long-term care insurance. 
As with acute care, future veterans in Priority Groups 1 through 6 would gain eligibility 
for this program.
REFORMING THE VA IN PHASES
Since we cannot accurately predict how quickly the Veterans Independence Act’s 
private insurance options would reduce patient volume at VHA facilities, it might 
be appropriate to phase those options in, so as to give the VHA time to adjust to 
any unexpected changes, and to allow Congress the opportunity to revisit the law if 
the decline in the utilization of VHA facilities is unexpectedly high or low.
We have modeled one such way to phase in the VetsCare Choice and VetsCare Senior 
programs. Under this approach, Priority Groups 1 through 3 would gain access to the 
premium support option upon enactment of the Veterans Independence Act. Priority 
Groups 4 through 8 would gain access to the premium support option five years after 
enactment. Two-thirds of the VA’s patient volume comes from Priority Groups 4 through 
8; hence, the phase-in of these veterans into premium support should allow the VHA 
time to evaluate the effects of premium support on its inpatient volume and capacity. 
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THE RELATIVE COST OF VA HEALTH CARE
First is the issue of costs per enrollee. It is widely believed that VA-based care costs 
less than the equivalent amount of care delivered in the private sector. However, a 
December 2014 report from the Congressional Budget Office found that “limited 
evidence and substantial uncertainty make it difficult to reach firm conclusions about 
those relative costs or about whether it would be cheaper to expand veterans’ access to 
health care in the future through VHA facilities or the private sector.”67
The VA, according to the CBO, “has provided limited data to the Congress and the 
public about its costs and operational performance,” making direct comparisons 
to the private sector difficult. In addition, as noted above, even veterans who do 
use the VA system receive an average of 70 percent of their health care outside of 
the VA. In 2008, according to CBO, the total was 77 percent. Furthermore, lower 
per-enrollee costs are only meaningful if the quality of care is equivalent or better.
One study by VA researchers, cited by the CBO, suggested that VA per-enrollee costs 
would be 20 percent lower than costs in Medicare’s traditional fee-for-service program.68 
The study was published in 2004, using 1999 data. The largest difference between 
the two programs was prescription drug costs, which the researchers estimated as 70 
percent higher in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. This difference accounted for 
nearly half of the difference in estimated VA and Medicare costs.
However, this study has several limitations. Medicare in 1999 had a much different 
system for paying for prescription drugs than it does today. Over the last decade, the 
growth rate of Medicare spending has considerably declined. Furthermore, as more 
health care is delivered outside of the hospital setting, while the VA has considerably 
expanded its outpatient services, the CBO notes that “it is unclear whether VHA has 
maintained a cost advantage for outpatient services.” 
Many of the VHA’s administrative costs flow through other 
departments of the VA, or other government agencies  
altogether, making a true cost comparison more difficult.
Most importantly, the Medicare Advantage program—under which nearly one-third of 
Medicare beneficiaries gain coverage from private insurers—appears to reduce per- 
enrollee spending by as much as 13 percent, on an apples-to-apples basis, according 
to a 2012 study by three Harvard economists published in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association.69
III.  Additional Policy Considerations
Allowing veterans to control their own health care dollars may seem like a simple idea. 
As we have noted above, however, the implementation of that idea requires taking 
several policy considerations into account.
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It is also worth noting that the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 
2014 (VACAA) offers veterans the opportunity to seek care outside the VA system 
if they experience delays in receiving care in VA facilities. Funding for this program is 
expected to dry out some time after fiscal year 2016. However, it is realistic to assume 
that VACAA’s funding would be renewed by Congress in the absence of more far- 
reaching reform like the Veterans Independence Act.
For the purposes of the Veterans Independence Act, insurers will be expected to offer 
plans similar in costs per enrollee to those in the Medicare Advantage program.
THE FISCAL COSTS OF A MORE ATTRACTIVE PROGRAM
Recent congressional proposals to improve veterans’ health care have been stymied by 
another problem: that a more attractive VA health care program would, by definition, 
attract more veterans to enroll, increasing its overall spending. 
However, a well-designed reform can offset these higher VA costs by savings from 
reduced enrollment in other federally subsidized health care programs, such as Medicaid, 
the Affordable Care Act, employer-sponsored insurance, and Medicare. Ideally, these cost 
savings should be credited to VHA in calculating total tail end military personnel costs.
In addition, many health care policy experts believe that widespread use of premium 
support will lower the growth rate of health care expenditures, reducing future costs. 
For evidence, they cite the performance of the Medicare Part D prescription drug 
program; the Medicare Part C program commonly known as “Medicare Advantage,” 
and the fact that for 2015, premium assistance subsidies in the insurance exchanges 
established by the Affordable Care Act are estimated to cost 18 percent less than 
originally predicted by the Congressional Budget Office.70
The VetsCare Choice and VetsCare Senior programs take into 
account the interactions between VA-based health insurance 
and various civilian programs. For example, in order to prevent double 
subsidization, able-bodied veterans who are offered employer-sponsored coverage 
should not be eligible for VetsCare Choice. In addition, veterans who enroll in Medicaid 
or the Affordable Care Act’s exchange-based insurance plans would not be eligible for 
VetsCare Choice, though they may remain eligible for VetsCare Federal, if they had 
been eligible for traditional VA-based care prior to reform.
It will be important for the Congressional Budget Office to gain access to empirical data 
from the VA with which to estimate the percentage of veterans who would remain in 
VetsCare Federal under a reformed system, relative to those who would elect to enroll 
in VetsCare Choice or VetsCare Senior. 
In addition, CBO can provide Congress with guidance as to how different approaches 
to VetsCare Choice and VetsCare Senior might increase the degree to which the VA 
would be expected to fund non-service-connected health care costs.
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LOWER UTILIZATION OF VA FACILITIES
USAGE OF THE VA SYSTEM BY NON-VETERANS
If more veterans have access to the private, voluntary U.S. 
health care system, it goes to follow that fewer veterans will 
use proprietary VA facilities. Already, as noted above, VHA enrollees obtain 
70 percent of their health care outside the VA system, if not more. In 2011, a VHA 
survey found that 77 percent of VHA enrollees were enrolled in non-VA-based health 
insurance plans.71 And the high fixed costs of maintaining VA hospitals siphon funds 
away from the provision to veterans of high quality health care; this problem will grow 
more acute if more veterans seek care outside the VA.
For these reasons, the Veterans Independence Act contains provisions to rationalize the 
maintenance of VA facilities.
Today, a small number of non-veterans are eligible for VA benefits, primarily through 
the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(CHAMPVA). In 2012, 375,000 individuals were enrolled in CHAMPVA, at an 
annual cost of $1.2 billion.72
CHAMPVA is intended for spouses and children of veterans who have died, or have 
become permanently and totally disabled due to a service-connected injury, and are 
otherwise ineligible for benefits through the Department of Defense’s TRICARE program.
CHAMPVA is similar to Medicare in that it is a government-run insurer that contracts 
with voluntary health care providers. Those eligible for CHAMPVA are not eligible for 
health care services at VA facilities unless they themselves are also directly eligible for VA 
coverage. Like TRICARE, CHAMPVA reimbursement rates to health care providers are 
similar to those in the Medicare program.
CHAMPVA insurance includes some cost-sharing. Enrollees are responsible for 
approximately 25 percent of inpatient medical costs up to a deductible of $3,000; 
deductibles for outpatient care are $50 per individual or $100 per family; above these 
deductibles, CHAMPVA pays for 75 percent of medical costs. The program serves as 
a secondary payer whereby those enrolled in private insurance or Medicare must seek 
reimbursement from those programs before seeking coverage from CHAMPVA.
Under the Veterans Independence Act, the CHAMPVA program would remain as is, 
with enrollees receiving care from voluntary facilities.
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MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF 
VETERANS HEALTH REFORM
As we have seen in the past, the mission is not over once Congress has passed a bill. If the 
Veterans Independence Act were to be enacted, it would be incumbent upon Congress 
to “keep the foot on the gas” and ensure appropriate progress with the implementation 
of VHA reform.
With that in mind, the Veterans Independence Act would create a nonpartisan 
commission, modeled after the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), 
to assist and advise Congress and the Department of Veterans Affairs on veterans’ health 
reform. Membership in the VetsCare Implementation Commission would comprise 
solely of health care experts in academia, the private sector, and the veterans’ community.
The commission’s mandate would be to manage the implementation of reform, monitor 
progress in delivering reform, to continuously assess the quality of VA health care delivery 
and coverage, and to recommend refinements to congressional statutes and federal 
regulations where needed to improve veterans’ care.
7.  
FISCAL
CONSIDERATIONS
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Fiscal Considerations
Many previous attempts at veterans’ health reform have foundered 
due to the VA’s—and the nation’s—fiscal constraints. 
Congressional rules, known as PAYGO, require most increases in 
direct federal spending to be offset by an equivalent amount of 
spending reductions or tax increases elsewhere. PAYGO rules 
exist for a reason. The Congressional Budget Office estimates 
that “under current law, [federal] debt would exceed 100 percent 
of GDP 25 years from now and would continue on an upward 
trajectory thereafter—a trend that could not be sustained.”73 These 
trends are driven in large part by the aging U.S. population, and 
related spending on Social Security and Medicare.
Fortunately, the Veterans Health Administration does not suffer 
from a lack of funds. However, too large a proportion of 
its funds are spent on underused facilities. This 
problem not only constrains the VHA’s ability to 
devote resources to patient care; it also stymies 
efforts to allow veterans to seek care outside 
the VA.
Imagine a situation in which you own your own car, but choose 
to rent another car when you want to leave town, because you 
believe that the rental car drives better than the one you own. In 
reality, few people do this; instead, they either drive the car they 
own, or choose not to own a car and solely use rentals.
This, in a nutshell, is the conundrum facing VA reformers. 
Facilitating the ability of veterans to seek care outside the VA 
system involves paying for both that external care (the rental car) 
and the upkeep of underused VHA facilities (the owned car). 
Furthermore, it is widely believed that private health care providers 
are somewhat costlier than VHA providers, though it is difficult 
to quantify this difference.
One of the core goals of the Taskforce was to 
give veterans access to civilian health care 
facilities in a fiscally responsible manner. The 
Veterans Independence Act uses two tools to 
achieve this goal. First, the VIA proposes to 
help the VHA rationalize its brick-and-mortar 
footprint, thereby freeing up more resources or 
patient care. Second, the VIA’s private coverage 
options—VetsCare Choice and VetsCare Senior— 
are carefully designed, with co-pays and 
deductibles, so as to ensure that these programs 
do not strain the VHA’s appropriated budget.
In order to test the fiscal credibility of various approaches to VHA 
reform, including the one proposed here, Concerned Veterans 
for America retained the services of Health Systems Innovation 
Network, LLC (HSI), led by University of Minnesota economist 
Stephen T. Parente. Parente and his colleagues have been engaged 
by numerous members of Congress to model health reform 
proposals.74 He has served as a Legislative Fellow in the office of 
Sen. John D. Rockefeller (D., W.V.) and as a health policy adviser 
to Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.). Since 2002, Parente has been 
a principal investigator for studies on consumer directed health 
plans funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
The full text of HSI’s report is subjoined to this document as 
Appendix 11e.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Due to the limited availability of detailed data from the Veterans 
Health Administration as to the utilization and cost-effectiveness 
of VHA services, it was necessary for HSI to make educated 
assumptions in order to model future spending by the Veterans 
Health Administration, and also to model the fiscal effects of the 
Veterans Independence Act. There are numerous limitations 
to HSI’s analysis; we discuss these issues at the end of this 
section. We believe that an evaluation of this proposal by the 
Congressional Budget Office will offer us further opportunities to 
refine our recommendations.
HSI forecast both baseline VHA spending, and spending under 
reform, through fiscal year 2025. Under the baseline scenario, 
HSI assumed: (1) that there would be no changes to the VHA’s 
eligibility criteria; (2) that VHA patients as a percentage of 
the living veteran population would remain at 2013 levels of 
29.1 percent; (3) that utilization of health care services among 
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THE VETERANS ACCOUNTABLE
CARE ORGANIZATION (VACO)
THE VETERANS HEALTH INSURANCE
PROGRAM (VHIP)
In order to estimate the fiscal effects of the Veterans Independence 
Act, HSI built a model that separated out the VHA’s gross 
spending on its provider functions, such as brick-and-mortar 
facilities and clinical personnel. 
In addition, HSI conducted a sensitivity analysis of the impact 
of the VIA on retention of veterans by VHA facilities. HSI 
estimated revenues, expenses, and required inpatient beds in 
four scenarios: (1) 100 percent retention of the baseline VHA 
population; (2) 75 percent retention; (3) 50 percent retention; 
(4) 25 percent retention.
HSI estimated that, absent reform, VACO would incur expenses in 
the year 2025 of approximately $73 billion. Under Reform Scenario 
2, if VACO retained 75 percent of the patient volume it had under 
the old system, 2025 expenses would approximate $64 billion—a 
significant cost-savings.
The Veterans Independence Act proposes to separate the payor 
and provider functions of the Veterans Health Administration. 
The health insurance (payor) functions would be assigned to the 
Veterans Health Insurance Program (VHIP), and the health care 
delivery (provider) functions would be assigned to an independent, 
government-chartered corporation, the Veterans Accountable 
Care Organization (VACO).
individuals of comparable health status and demographic 
characteristics would remain constant; (4) that use of hospital 
services would increase alongside an aging population with a 
higher prevalence of chronic conditions; (5) that costs per visit 
by program and health care category would remain constant at 
2013 levels; (6) that future costs grow at a rate similar to those 
of the Medicare program.
HSI also modeled three approaches to offering VHA benefits to 
veterans of future wars: Reform Scenario 1, in which health coverage 
would be offered solely to veterans with service-connected injuries 
(Priority Groups 1 through 3); Reform Scenario 2, in which health 
coverage would be offered to a broader range of future veterans 
(Priority Groups 1 through 6); and “Reform All,” under which 
health coverage would be offered to future veterans in all Priority 
Groups including non-veterans. Reform Scenario 2 is the one 
proposed in the Veterans Independence Act. In each of the 
scenarios, all veterans enrolled in VA coverage prior to 2017 
would remain grandfathered into the benefits to which they are 
already eligible.
Reform
Scenario
Three VHA Reform Scenarios
Health coverage would be offered solely to 
veterans with service-connected injuries
Health coverage would be offered to a 
broader range of future veterans 
Health coverage would be offered to future 
veterans in all Priority Groups including 
non-veterans
1
2
3
Description
Under Reform Scenario 2, if VACO 
retained 75 percent of the patient 
volume it had under the old system, 
2025 expenses would approximate 
$64 billion—a significant cost-savings.
HSI modeled the expected premiums per unique patient, expected 
premium support payments, and expected VA expenditures per 
unique patient under the VetsCare Choice program. While we 
believe that there are a number of effective ways to design such a 
program, we chose to focus on one possible approach for modeling 
purposes: the system of graduated premium support payments 
based on Priority Group.
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Furthermore, HSI estimated the number of veterans—expressed as a percentage of 
VHA unique patients—who would choose to seek private coverage through VetsCare 
Choice, instead of remaining in the traditional VetsCare Federal program, by Priority 
Group. HSI projected that between 25 and 45 percent of veterans with service-connected 
disabilities would enroll in VetsCare Choice; in most other Priority Groups, a lower 
proportion of veterans would enroll in the private-coverage option. 
   Priority         PSM Category         Premium          Subsidy           Total Payment          % Actuarial Value       Revised Payment
   Group               (VA Obligation)           (VA Obligation)
     0  Diamond                  $8,130              $6,469                 $14,599                            100%                               $14,599
     1  Platinum                  $8,130              $6,469                 $14,599                             90%                                 $13,139
     2  Platinum                  $8,130              $6,469                 $14,599                             90%                                 $13,139
     3  Gold                         $7,485              $5,878                 $13,363                             80%                                 $10,690
     4  Gold                         $7,485              $5,878                 $13,363                             80%                                 $10,690
     5  Silver                        $6,812              $3,854                 $10,666                             70%                                 $7,466
     6  Silver                        $6,812              $3,854                 $10,666                             70%                                 $7,466
     7  Bronze                      $4,033              $2,423                $6,456                               60%                                  $3,874
     8  Bronze                      $4,033              $2,423                $6,456                               60%                                  $3,874
    Non-    Bronze                      $4,033              $2,423                $6,456                               60%                                  $3,874
  Veterans
THE VETERANS HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM (VHIP)
HSI modeled the expected premiums per unique patient, expected premium support 
payments, and expected VA expenditures per unique patient under the VetsCare 
Choice program. While we believe that there are a number of effective ways to design 
such a program, we chose to focus on one possible approach for modeling purposes: 
the system of graduated premium support payments based on Priority Group.
   Priority Group
1. >50% service-connected disabilities
2. 30-40% service-connected disabilities
3. Former POWs et al, 10-20% disabled
4. Non-service connected disabled
5. Low-income able-bodied veterans
6. Vietnam, Persian Gulf  vets et al.
8. Higher-income vets (≤110% VA NIT)
9. Non-Veterans
7. Low-income veterans willing to copay
25%
25%
25%
5%
5%
25%
10%
10%
15%
45%
45%
45%
15%
15%
45%
20%
20%
30%
The proposed system of graduated premium support through VetsCare Choice 
effectively prioritizes increased access to coverage and care for veterans with service- 
connected disabilities.
Low High
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Long-Term Care
HSI could not estimate long-term care spending by the VA under the baseline 
scenario, because the VA does not publish data on acute-care vs. long-term care 
spending by Priority Group. Importantly, the Veterans Independence Act proposes 
to subsidize enrollment by VHA unique patients in the Federal Long Term Care 
Insurance Program (FLTCIP). However, because of the unavailability of veterans’ 
long-term care data, it was not possible to fiscally model this component of the 
reform proposal.
Retired members of the uniformed services are already eligible for FLTCIP. Hence, 
it is possible that the fiscal costs of enrolling non-elderly veterans in FLTCIP are 
relatively low. However, we will need to await more detailed data from the VA or 
the Congressional Budget Office in order to refine this analysis.
FISCAL OUTCOMES
In 2025, absent reform, HSI estimates that VA obligations for medical care—acute 
care and long-term care—will approximate $73 billion. However, the unavailability of 
important data related to VA health spending made it difficult to produce an apples-
to-apples comparison of spending under the Veterans Independence Act and the 
baseline figure of $73 billion. A properly designed version of this reform is likely to be 
deficit neutral, especially if the newly independent VACO is successful at rationalizing 
the VHA’s physical footprint.
A properly designed version of this reform is likely to 
be deficit neutral, especially if the newly independent 
VACO is successful at rationalizing the VHA’s physical 
footprint.
Acute care
For Reform Scenario 2—the one proposed in the Veterans Independence Act—
VA acute-care spending would approximate $69–71 billion.
In Reform Scenario 1, under which only future veterans with service-connected 
disabilities gained eligibility for VA health coverage, acute care spending would be 
almost the same as in Reform Scenario 2 (lower by approximately $150 million). 
This is because the bulk of veterans’ health spending over the next decade is driven 
by current veterans and disabled future veterans.
In “Reform All,” the scenario under which future veterans from all Priority Groups 
would be eligible for VA health coverage, 2025 spending would approximate $72 billion.
8.  
CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
If reforming veterans health care were easy, it would already 
have been achieved. In this report, we have documented the 
numerous hurdles faced by reformers. Government agencies 
are inherently inefficient; an “iron triangle” of special interests 
opposes VA reform; the VHA’s fixed costs for hospitals and 
other facilities limit the agency’s flexibility in offering health 
care choices to veterans.
These hurdles must no longer hinder us. America’s veterans have 
sacrificed too much, and achieved too much, for us to make excuses 
as to the difficulty of VA reform. After months of intensive  
discussions, analysis, and consideration, we believe that our 
Taskforce has come up with the most plausible pathway to long-
term reform of veterans health care.
First, it is critical to restructure the VA’s health care facilities into 
an independent, government-chartered corporation. Only under 
such a structure can the VA rationalize its fixed costs, freeing up 
the resources needed to offer veterans access to a broad range of 
VA and civilian health care options.
Second, the only way to offer veterans true choice in health care 
is to give them access to private insurance options that contract 
with voluntary hospitals and private physicians. In order to make 
these options fiscally responsible, they must include cost-sharing 
provisions, especially for veterans without service-connected injuries.
Third, reform of both the VHA’s provider and payor functions 
must be carefully designed so as to preserve the traditional VA 
system as an option for those veterans who prefer it, and so as 
to strengthen the posture of VA facilities with regard to long-
term demographic realities.
Fourth, the VA must begin to report detailed data about the 
financial and clinical aspects of its operations. Without this 
information, the Congressional Budget Office and independent 
economists will risk making inaccurate projections about the fiscal 
impact of reform proposals, in either an optimistic or pessimistic 
direction. In addition, such transparency is necessary to monitor 
the quality of veterans’ health outcomes.
For years, lawmakers and veterans have privately asked important 
questions. Why can’t the VA do more to serve those with service- 
connected injuries? Why not let veterans take the dollars that the 
VA spends on their health care, and deploy them to gain care 
wherever they choose?
Why not, indeed. It is long past time to bring this conversation 
out into the open. Concerned Veterans for America is committed to 
overcoming any and all obstacles that stand in the way of achieving 
these goals. We look forward to working with anyone, and everyone, 
who shares them.
Concerned Veterans for America and the Fixing Veterans’ Health 
Care Taskforce would like to thank the following individuals for 
their contributions to this report, without which it could not have 
been completed.
The support of CVA staff—top to bottom—was instrumental 
the successful completion of this report. Tal Coley, Fred 
Ferreira, Brandon Davis, Dan Caldwell, and 
Caroline Phelps all played critical roles in ensuring this 
report was properly resourced, written, vetted, communicated, 
edited—and edited again. Without their tireless input—day-
by-day, draft-by-draft, and detail-by-detail—this report would 
not have been possible.
Shelley Oberlin, Senior Manager at HSI Network, LLC, 
spent countless hours working with the Taskforce to estimate the 
fiscal and economic impact of the Veterans Independence Act. 
The credibility of our fiscal proposals is due in great part to her.
We also want to recognize the team at The Tarrance Group 
for their invaluable insights into our polling results. Their dedication 
to the right questions, in the right manner—and to the right cross- 
section of veterans—ensured our polling numbers were both 
bulletproof and extremely insightful.
Numerous veterans leaders, congressional staffers, and outside 
advisors were silent partners in this project—and we are indebted 
for their input. While their names are not associated with our 
findings, their guidance throughout the process ensured our 
research was thorough and recommendations were grounded in 
reality.  We specifically thank the leaders of many veterans service 
organizations who contributed to our roundtable session.
Finally, we recognize—and thank—the thousands of veterans, 
military families, and VA employees who submitted to our online 
portal, responded to our poll, and engaged directly with our 
Taskforce. This project has been of, by, and for America’s 
veterans—and we are indebted to your input.
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Annex A:
TASKFORCE MEETINGS AND PARTICIPANTS
The Taskforce met 8 times at Concerned Veterans for America’s Headquarters in 
Arlington, VA.
 • September 23, 2014
 • October 3, 2014
 • October 16, 2014
 • November 5, 2014
 • November 18, 2014
 • December 9, 2014
 • January 21, 2015
 • February 12, 2015
These meetings were used to discuss the contents of this report, the questions around 
the process and the future of veterans health care and its interplay with the broader 
health care market. For these meetings, there were present:
Taskforce Co-Chairs:
 • Dr. Michael Kussman   • Avik Roy
 • Rep. Jim Marshall   • Dr. Bill Frist  
      (and Dr. Martha Presley, 
        Office of Dr. Frist)
CVA Staff:
 • Darin Selnick, Taskforce Executive Director
 • Pete Hegseth    • Tal Coley
 • Fred Ferreira    • Brandon Davis
 • Caroline Phelps   • Dan Caldwell
In certain meetings, there was the participation of individuals who were not officially 
part of the Taskforce that presented their perspectives on veterans health care to the 
Taskforce. Nonetheless, to enable a most open and honest conversation and because 
the discussions were not for attribution, their names have been omitted from the report.
Annex B:
SUBMISSION PORTAL
Top Line Information
Coded entries: 1473
71
Active Military
Civilian Supporter
Family Member
Veteran
Total
Reported VA Employees
6
88
125
1254
1473
21
Details on the Submissions
The submissions were divided into six major themes and each theme divided into 
positive or negative impressions, depending on the content of the submission. The 
goal is to reveal the major areas of concern for veterans on their experience with 
health care.
STAFF: entries that addressed staff ranged from problems related to staff behavior 
to commentary on the quantity and quality of the staff, or the rules that govern staff 
interaction with the public.
SERVICE: entries ranged from criticism of the quality of services provided to a lack 
of a desired service in the facility and expedience in the provision of those services.
ACCESS – entries ranged from not being able to book an appointment or receive 
benefits payment to not being able to speak to VA employees over the phone.
BENEFITS – entries ranged from not receiving a sufficient travel reimbursement 
to not having Wi-Fi in the hospitals waiting rooms.
CHOICE – entries were related to having the option of consulting with a medical 
professional outside the VA system and having the VA cover the costs.
PRIVATIZATION – entries were related to the idea of getting VA out of the 
business of providing care.
1254
21 88
1256
SUBMISSION SOURCES
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SUBMISSION CONTENT THEMES
IMPRESSIONS OF THEMES
IMPRESSIONS OF VA STATUS QUO
When sorted by negative and positive impressions of each theme, this is how the 
entries broke down:
When you sort the impressions by their general feeling towards the VA status 
quo, meaning positive impressions on benefits, access, staff, service, and negative 
impressions on choice and privatization, the above pie chart illustrates how the 
submission breaks down.
3%
97%
Annex C:
NATIONAL VETERANS’ SURVEY
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Below is a selection of questions from a recently completed survey of veterans across the 
nation. The Tarrance Group was commissioned by Concerned Veterans for America 
(CV4A) to conduct a national survey of 1,000 veterans. Half of the respondents 
(n=500) completed the interview by telephone and half (n=500) completed the interview 
on-line. The sample was drawn to correctly represent rank, branch of service, age and 
gender. A random sample of this type is likely to yield a margin of error of +3.1% in 95 
out of 100 cases were it possible to interview every veteran, active duty military and 
guard/reservist nationwide. Responses to the survey were gathered November 11-20, 2014.
4.   Have you seen, read, or heard anything about problems at 
      the Department of Veterans Affairs?
  Yes, have seen, read or heard   89% 
  No, have not seen, read, or heard   10%  
  Unsure                                                 1% 
5.   Even if you have not seen, read or heard anything about 
      problems– would you strongly favor, somewhat favor, 
      somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose efforts to reform 
      veteran health care in this country?
        Favor/strongly             72%       Favor/somewhat     18%            
        Oppose/somewhat     2%      Oppose/strongly    1% 
        UNSURE   7%
Here is a list of ideas that some people have said should be considered as a part of 
any efforts to reform veteran health care. Please answer, for each one, using a scale 
from 0 to 10, where 0 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means it is “extremely 
important,” how important each of these ideas is to you personally. 
Here is the first one:
(SPLIT SAMPLE)
7A. Increasing health care choices for veterans 
                                                   
  1% 1% * 6% 3% 7% 15% 14% 55%
 
7B. Increasing health care options for veterans 
          
  1%       *      *      *        1%        5%        2%        6%        15%        15%         55%
8. Ensuring veterans get the best possible care, even if 
          that means getting that care outside of a VA facility
 
  1%        *        *        *        *        2%        2%        4%        10%        11%        70%
      *= less than .5%
NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT
NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT
NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
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Annex D:
VETERANS SERVICE ORGANIZATION ROUNDTABLE
Concerned Veterans for America held a Veterans Service Organization (VSO) 
Roundtable on November 6, 2014 at the Army and Navy Club in Washington, DC. In 
order to have an open and honest discussion, the names of the participants are omitted 
and the discussion was not for attribution. 
The goals of the meeting were as follows:
 • Aggregate suggestions/ideas/solutions from leading veterans service 
   organizations
 • Identify existing challenges to veterans’ health care
 • Identify possible solutions to veterans’ health care
The roundtable was open to all Veterans Service Organizations. We had the participation 
of six major VSOs. Overall, the VSO roundtable served its main mission of illuminating 
the priorities and concerns that the VSO community share and also helped frame the 
discussions of the Taskforce. The roundtable was able to inform the work of the Taskforce 
and help compose a better image of the desires and aspirations of veterans’ communities. 
Following the roundtable, ongoing conversations were maintained with multiple VSO 
representatives throughout the Taskforce process.
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Caveat 
As mentioned in the December 2014 Congressional Budget Office Report, “Comparing 
the Costs of the Veterans’ Health Care System with Private-Sector Costs,” there is limited 
data available to the public around the VHA’s costs and operational performance. We 
used three primary data sources to build the foundation of our fiscal models. 
I. Department of Veterans Affairs, Volume II Medical Programs and Information 
Technology Programs, Congressional Submissions, Funding and Appropriations from 
FY2010 to FY2015
 A. Provided historical data from 2008 to 2013 for the following categories: 
  • Unique number of patients by Priority Groups 1-6 combined, 7 
     and 8, and non-veterans
  • Workloads (visits and patients treated by health care category)
  • Obligations by Activity (health care category) by health care program 
    (Medical Services, Medical Support and Compliance, and 
    Medical Facilities)
  • Obligations by Object (typical expense categories) by health care 
    program (Medical Services, Medical Support and Compliance, 
    and Medical Facilities)
II. Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration, Office of Policy 
and Planning.  Historical data tables prepared by the National Center for Veterans 
Analysis and Statistics (NCVAS)
 A. Provided historical data from 2008 to 2013 for the following categories: 
  • Unique number patients by Priority Group (1 – 8 separately and 
     non-veterans)
  • Average expenditures per patient per Priority Group
  • Selected Veterans Health Administration Characteristics  
Annex E:
FISCAL IMPACT ANALYSIS
In the winter of 2014, Concerned Veterans for America engaged Health Systems 
Innovation Network, LLC to assess the fiscal impacts of proposed reforms aimed 
at improving the Veterans Health Care System. After reviewing the reforms, we 
believed there were two fundamental goals: (1) provide veterans with an option of 
receiving health care outside the VHA and (2) remove potential government barriers 
to the VHA, enabling it to focus on providing high quality, safe, and efficient care. To 
begin to understand the fiscal impact of these changes, we restructured the current 
VA health care system cost structure (appropriations to Congress) into the VA as a 
payor and the VHA as an independent health care delivery system. This report 
summarizes the outputs of our analysis, references all data sources, and where data was 
not available describes our assumptions and rationale supporting those assumptions. 
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   (total enrollees in millions, total outpatient visits in millions, 
    total inpatient admissions in thousands)
III. Table 1L: VETPOP2014 Living Veterans by Age Group, Gender, 2013-2043 
retrieved from http://www.va.gov/vetdata/Veteran_Population.asp [Population  
Tables > the Nation Age/Gender > Living] 
 A. Provided population projections and age categories for living veterans 
      from 2013 to 2043
The challenge with the available data is several-fold including: inconsistencies around 
total values/numbers, variability of the categories by which the data is presented (e.g., 
individual Priority Groups vs combined Priority Groups), and a lack of detail needed 
to model the specific reforms as outlined in the Veterans Independence Act (VIA). 
For example, data is not available by age or income level by priority. With regards to 
utilization, ambulatory care visits are provided as staff and fee visits. We were unable 
to find data differentiating ambulatory care visits by an office visit (primary care or 
specialty), surgical case, procedure, major imaging, etc. Given these data limitations as 
well as others, we made several assumptions to reconcile the existing data and forecast 
a potential future environment.  Also, given the uncertainty around which veterans 
may choose to enroll in the premium support model and which veterans will choose to 
continue to use the VHA, we developed scenarios and sensitivity analyses to provide a 
range of potential outcomes that we believe is a reasonable starting point to discuss the 
fiscal impact of the proposed reforms on the VA health care system.
Methodology Overview
We developed two models to test the fiscal impact of the proposed reforms: A baseline 
model and a reform model. The baseline model assumes the status quo, meaning the 
VA health care system will continue to operate as it does today. The difference is a 
restructuring of the expenditures today to more directly tie to the change in patient 
populations. The reform model factors in the changes and assumptions as outlined 
in the Taskforce reform proposals. The forecasted timeframe for both models is from 
2013 to 2025. Data from 2008 to 2013 were used to assess trends. We did not include 
2014 to 2016 estimates from the FY2015 Funding and Appropriations Congressional 
Submission Report as these were estimates and we wanted to rely on actual data to the 
greatest extent possible. 
Table 1, on the following page, summarizes our key assumptions for the baseline 
and reform models. For the reform model, we developed two scenarios to test the 
impact on revised eligibility criteria for new veterans. Scenario 1 assumes newly 
eligible service-connected veterans (PG 1-3) will be covered by the VA through 
the premium support model starting in 2017. Scenario 2 assumes newly eligible 
veterans in Priority Groups 1 – 6 will be covered by the VA through the premium 
support model, also starting in 2017.  Both scenarios assume veterans using VA 
services prior to 2017 will be grandfathered in and given the option to enroll in the 
premium support model.
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Table 1: Summary of Assumptions for Baseline and Reform Models
     MODEL  KEY ASSUMPTIONS
     Baseline  • Forecast timeline is from 2013-2025
   • No change to eligibility criteria
   • Holds constant percent patient population/living 
      veteran at 2013 levels = 29.1%
   • Holds constant use rates per 1,000 population at 
     2013 levels; population varies by health care category 
   • Inpatient use rates adjusted to reflect aging  
      population and greater prevalence of chronic 
      conditions relative to US population
   • Holds constant costs/visit by program (Medical
     Services, Support & Compliance, and Facilities) 
     and by health care category
   • Forecasted costs factor in inflation with select 
     categories grown at estimated Medicare rates (4.0%)
     Reform All   Same Assumptions as baseline model with the 
    following changes:
   • Increase percent patient population/living veterans 
      to 34.4%; assume more enrollees may become 
      patients with choice
   • Include two scenarios to test fiscal impact of 
     changes to eligibility criteria
   • For both scenarios—all patients covered by the 
      VA prior to 2017 will be grandfathered in and 
      have the option of choosing premium support model
 
   REFORM SCENARIO 1: 
   By 2017, new patients in PGs 1-3 to be covered by 
   the VA as a payer
   REFORM SCENARIO 2: 
   By 2017, new patients in PGs 1-6 to be covered by 
   VA as a payer
Key drivers used to develop the forecast models for this project include patient 
population growth, use rates per 1,000 population by major health care category and 
costs per visits by medical program (medical services, support and compliance, and 
facilities) and health care category (ambulatory, inpatient, LTC, mental health, etc.). 
Obligations by medical programs (from the Congressional Submission Reports) were 
converted to revenues for the VHA and used as a starting point to discuss premiums 
and subsidies for the VA as a payor. Obligations by Object were converted to expenses 
for the VHA. Figure 1 provides an overview of our methodology. 
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Figure 1: Methodology Overview
Historical Patient 
Population by Priority 
Group 2025 Baseline Patient 
Population by Priority 
Group
VA as an Insurer
starting point for 
premiums
Cost per Patient by 
Priority Group
VHA HMO
Translate to revenue 
source
Baseline and Reform
2025 forecasted visits/patient treaded by health care category
2025 forecasted costs by health care category and by unique patient per PG
• Held constant 2013 use rates/1,000 pop
• Population varies by health care category
• IP use rates adjusted to reflect aging population
Held constant 2013 costs/visit by health care category and 
budget categories med secs, support & compliance, facilities
2025 Reform Patient 
Population by Priority 
Group
Historical and Projected 
Living Veterans
29.1% OF 
LIVING VETS 
2013 LEVELS
34.4% OF
LIVING VETS
PSM GROWTH
Historical and Forecasted Veteran Patient Population 
In developing a population market forecast for a delivery system in the private sector, 
there are a number of data sources to help inform a reasonable growth rate. Whether 
it is Census.gov, Claritas, or State/County Departments of Finance, most of these 
provide population projections by zip code (or other geographic region), by age category, 
and by gender. Forecasting the veterans’ patient population is more challenging given 
limited data on population projections and uncertainty around the future environment. 
Will there be another war? If so, to what extent will it drive the need for future health care 
services? If roughly 75% to 99% (varies by age) of veterans have another source of health 
care coverage,75  how many will be eligible and choose to use the VA? 
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Our first step to forecast the future veteran patient population, was to merge existing 
historical data into a format that allowed us assess patient population by Priority 
Group while maintaining the appropriate patient population that tied to utilization 
and cost data.  To do this, we calculated the percentage of patient population by 
Priority Group from the VHA Office of Policy and Planning (which provides the 
number of patients by all Priority Groups) and applied these percentages to the totals 
from the congressional submission reports (which combines the number of patients 
into three categories Priority Groups 1-6, Priority Groups 7-8, and non-veterans (see 
Appendix for the difference in patient population between these two data sources). 
The blending of these data sources resulted in revised patient populations by Priority 
Group with totals that directly tied to utilization and cost data from 2008 to 2013. 
From Table 2 below, the overall number of unique patients has grown from 5.6 million 
in 2008 to 6.5 million in 2013; an increase of approximately 900,000 patients. With 
the exception of Priority Group 6 and non-veterans, the number of service-connected 
veterans (PGs 1-3) have grown the fastest per year from 2008 to 2013, which is 
consistent with the findings from the NCVAS Trends in Utilization of VA Programs 
and Services: FY2009 to FY2013.76 Over the same time period, the number of patients 
in Priority Groups 5 and 8 declined – a trend we carried forward in our projections.
Table 2: Revised Unique Patients per Priority Group – 
Blended Data Sources
Notes: CAGR = Compounded Annual Growth Rate; Unique patients are uniquely 
identified individuals treated by VA or whose treatment is paid for by VA. Non-veterans 
include active duty military and reserve, spousal collateral, consultations and instruction, 
CHAMPVA workload, reimbursable workload with affiliates, humanitarian care, and 
employees receiving preventive occupational immunizations such as Hepatitis A&B and 
flu vaccinations. 
    
After reviewing data from the VA and external reports, and testing other potential 
forecast methodologies, we chose to forecast the total future patient population as a 
percentage of living veterans – similar to a market share forecast. For the baseline model 
we held constant the percentage of unique patients per living veteran at 2013 levels, which 
Priority Group
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Subtotal
Non-Veterans
Total
2008
 899,503 
 369,747 
 592,297 
 188,307 
 1,456,841 
 202,364 
 134,253 
 1,234,956 
 5,078,269 
 498,420
5,576,689
2009
990,506 
404,544 
646,589 
189,134 
1,422,463 
221,720 
127,714 
1,218,912 
5,221,583 
523,110  
5,744,693
2010
1,085,318 
431,470 
686,451 
191,889 
1,466,519 
247,680 
145,981 
1,185,752 
5,441,059 
559,051  
6,000,110
2011
 1,192,563 
 447,631 
 694,994 
 193,322 
 1,456,597 
 269,362 
 157,152 
 1,170,549 
 5,582,171 
 584,020  
6,166,191
2012
1,321,903 
460,985 
705,097 
193,594 
1,432,544 
274,987 
141,605 
1,149,659 
5,680,374 
652,717  
6,333,091
2013
1,467,527 
479,005 
729,439 
194,336 
1,375,394 
278,805 
154,452 
1,124,933 
5,803,890 
680,774  
6,484,664
Chg 08-13
568,023 
109,257 
137,142 
6,029 
(81,447)
76,440 
20,199 
(110,023)
725,621 
182,354  
907,975
CAGR 08-13
10.29%
5.31%
4.25%
0.63%
-1.14%
6.62%
2.84%
-1.85%
2.71%
6.43%
3.06%
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was 29.1%. For the reform models, we assumed a slight increase to 34.4% based on 
the idea that more enrollees may choose the VA as a payor with the premium support 
model.  Figure 2 shows the total number of living veterans and unique patients for 
2008, 2013 and our 2025 forecast models including both reform scenarios. From 2008 
to 2013, the number of living veterans declined from 23.2 million to 22.3 million, and is 
projected to decline further to 18.7 million by 2025. The number of unique patients is 
forecasted to decrease to 5.4 million in the baseline model and 6.3 million to 6.4 million 
in the reform model – varies by scenario.
Figure 2: Historical and Forecasted Living Veterans and 
Unique Patients, 2008, 2013 and 2025
Living Veterans Unique Patients
Rationale and Assumptions:
For the purposes of this fiscal impact analysis, we did not assume there would be any 
major wars from now through 2025. The models are flexible to adjust this assumption 
over time. 
Projections of living veterans by age from 2013 to 2043 was deemed the only relevant 
source of data (for this scope of work) with projections through 2025. We were not 
able to find any patient projections by Priority Group. 
An alternative forecast methodology is to apply historical growth rates assuming 
the same trends will continue for the next ten years. We tested the impact of two 
growth rates: (1) the historical patient population growth rates by Priority Group 
from 2008 to 2013 (as shown in Table 2 above) and (2) a 1.8% growth rate based 
on the estimated patient population change from 2013 to 2016 from the FY2015 
congressional submission report. The results were patient population projections 
ranging from 8.0 million to 9.3 million. While the percentage of patients per living 
veteran increased from 24% in 2008 to 29.1% in 2013, an increase to 43% or 50% 
of patients/living veterans by 2025 seemed unlikely considering the fact that the number 
of living veterans is projected to decline and more than 70% of veterans have another 
source of care; and, of those, most tend to receive health care outside the VHA. 
•
•
•
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
2013 2025 Baseline 2025 Reform All 2025 Reform
Scenario 1
2025 Reform
Scenario 2
2008
23.2 22.3 18.7 18.7 18.7 18.7
5.578 6.485 5.447 6.444 6.342 6.363
% PATIENTS/LV
24.0% 29.1% 29.1% 34.4% 33.9% 34.0%
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To determine the percentage of patients per living veteran for the reform model, we 
triangulated growth rates and projections from a few externals sources, including a 
2009 coalition commission report and a 2010 CBO report. The latter also describes the 
difficulty with projecting the number of future veterans and therefore developed two 
potential scenarios.77 The two data sources varied in the population assessed (unique 
patients vs. enrollees) and both assumed increased eligibility criteria, particularly for 
Priority Group 8. Where possible, we removed the estimated population for PG8 
and applied the growth rates from these projections to our 2013 baseline population. 
We then calculated the percentage of these population estimates per living veteran 
and took the average. This led to the 34.4% of patients per living veteran assumption. 
After reviewing this with the CVA Taskforce, there was agreement that a 5% growth in 
patients per living veteran was a reasonable assumption. 
To forecast the number of patients by Priority Group, we calculated the annual percent 
change per year by Priority Group from 2008 to 2013 and created an adjustment factor 
to maintain a similar distribution of patients. We then applied this adjustment factor to 
the total 2025 population and used the CAGR from 2013 to 2025 to forecast the number 
of unique patients per Priority Group per year from 2013 to 2025. Figure 3 shows the 
percentage of patient population by Priority Group for 2008, 2013 and 2025. In line 
with the proposed reforms, the number of service-connected patients increases from 
41.3% in 2013 to 45% - 46% by 2025. From this point forward, only scenarios 1 and 2 
will be shown (unless otherwise noted) as the Reform All model was used to forecast 
all patients (Priority Groups 1-8 and non-veterans) prior to incorporating the revised 
eligibility criteria. 
Figure 3: Percentage of Unique Patients by Priority Group 
2008, 2013, 2025
•
16.13% 22.63%
26.60% 27.02% 26.94%
6.63%
7.39%
7.70% 7.82% 7.80%10.62%
11.25%
11.50% 11.68% 11.65%
3.38%
3.00%
2.60% 2.64% 2.63%26.12%
21.21% 18.20% 18.49% 18.43%
3.63% 4.30%
4.50% 4.26% 4.56%2.41% 2.38%
2.50% 2.36% 2.35%
22.14% 17.35% 15.00% 15.24% 15.19%
8.94% 10.50% 11.40% 10.49% 10.46%
2008 2013 2025 Baseline 2025 Reform
Scenario 1
2025 Reform
Scenario 2
Percent of Unique Patients by Priority Group
Non-Veterans
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
46.4%41.3% 45.8% 46.5%33.4% % Service Connected
PGs 1, 2, and 3
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Historical and Forecasted Visits/Patients Treated by 
Health Care Category 
Historical visit data was obtained from the FY2010 to FY2015 congressional submission 
reports. Data varied by year so we created a mapping to match earlier year categories to 
2013 actual data. See appendix for category mapping. Also, there are several terms used 
to describe utilization metrics including workloads, patients treated and visits. For the 
purposes of this report, we will use visits and patients treated interchangeably. 
The veterans’ health care system appears to provide comprehensive health care services 
along the continuum of care. From Table 3, patients treated are categorized along eight 
health care categories: ambulatory care; inpatient care; rehabilitative care; mental health; 
long-term care (LTC); dental care; CHAMPVA, Spina Bifida, FMP, CWVV; and 
readjustment counseling.  In 2013, the number of visits (or patients treated) at the VA 
was more than 110 million. This was an increase of ~30 million visits over the last five 
years. Ambulatory visits represent more than 80% of all patient visits. Patients treated 
in ambulatory care and CHAMPVA, Spina Bifida, FMP, CWVV grew the fastest 
from 2008 to 2013 with annual growth rates of 6.27% and 11.79%, respectively. Inpatient 
growth has remained relatively flat, which may be due to the shift from inpatient to 
outpatient and/or potential capacity constraints in some locations. The bundling of data 
by health care category makes it difficult to draw detailed conclusions. 
Table 3: 2008 to 2013 Visits by Health Care Category 
Visits/Patients Treated  2008      2009        2010          2011             2012                2013 Chg 08-13       CAGR 08-13
Ambulatory Care  66,527,000      73,474,000    79,556,000     83,127,000    87,185,000     90,180,000  23,653,000         6.27%
Inpatient Care  591,825      622,146        627,648           630,242         633,148          623,839  32,014         1.06%
Rehabilliation Care  14,486      15,165        15,628            15,910           16,091             15,996   1,510         2.00%
Mental Health   138,295      141,057        160,882           157,810         155,677           152,863   14,568         2.02%
Long-term Care  96,253      98,725        100,239           97,221           101,720           108,625  12,372                2.45%
Dental Care  3,463,377     3,746,023       3,946,188       4,120,152      4,089,000        4,182,000          718,623             3.84%
CHAMPVA, Spina Bifida,  7,883,000     8,892,000       10,713,000     11,019,000    12,691,000     13,764,000  5,881,000         11.79% 
FMP, CWVV 
Readjustment Counseling 1,113,000     1,188,000       1,283,000       1,377,000      1,505,000       1,540,000          427,000              6.71%
Total    79,827,236     88,177,116     96,402,585    100,544,33    106,376,636   110,567,323     30,740,087         6.73%
Note: Data for ambulatory visit provided in thousands so adjusted accordingly for modeling  
Forecasted visits are based on patient population growth and use rates per 1,000 patients. See Table 4 for use rates by health 
care category.
Table 4: Use rates per 1,000 population by Health Care Category
Use Rates/1,000 population 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012       2013  Assumption
Ambulatory Care /
Total Population  11,929.48   12,789.89   13,259.09   13,481.09   13,766.58       13,906.66  13,906.66 
Inpatient Care / PG 1-8 116.54   119.15   115.35   112.90   111.46        107.49   113.82 
Rehabilliation Care / PG 1-8 2.85   2.90   2.87   2.85   2.83        2.76   2.76 
Mental Health / Total Population  24.80   24.55   26.81   25.59   24.58        23.57   23.57 
Long-term Care / PG 1-8 18.95   18.91   18.42   17.42   17.91        18.72   18.72 
Dental Care / Total Population  621.05   652.08   657.69   668.18   645.66        644.91   644.91 
CHAMPVA, SB, FMP, CWVV  
/ non-vet   15,815.98   16,998.34   19,162.83   18,867.50   19,443.34        20,218.16  20,218.16 
Readjustment Counseling / 
Total Pop   199.58   206.80   213.83   223.31   237.64        237.48   237.48 
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RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Due to the bundling of data by health care category (e.g., limited data by surgeries, 
office visit, type of inpatient admission, etc.), we were hesitant to make detailed 
assumptions about changes to utilization of services. We also presumed many of 
these services (e.g., rehab, mental health) are unique to the veteran population, so 
without additional data – quantitative or qualitative, we held constant 2013 use rates 
by health care category from 2013 to 2025 for both the baseline and reform model. 
The exception is inpatient use rates. While we recognize there has been a decline 
in inpatient utilization, an inpatient use rate of 107.49 per 1,000 patients for this 
population seemed low for the following reasons: (1) it did not align with the 2013 
calculated inpatient use rate from the VHA Office of Policy and Planning statistics 
which was ~115 admissions/1,000 patients; (2) we wanted to factor in the aging of 
the population (see appendix) and the higher prevalence of chronic conditions for the 
veteran population;78 and (3) we assumed the shift from inpatient to outpatient has 
already taken place. As described by Auerbach et al., the doubling of the number of 
outpatients since the 1990s is partly due to the general shift to outpatient settings and 
a shift in VA budgeting practices (a move to a capitated budgeting system).79  
Based on information included the narrative and footnotes of the congressional 
reports, we varied the population denominator by health care category (see Table 4). 
Table 5 shows the forecasted number of patients treated by health care category and 
by forecast model. By 2025, total visits are projected to decline by ~16.6 million in the 
baseline model and ~ 2.0 million to 2.3 million in the reform scenarios. The decline is 
slightly less than the decline in overall patient population growth given the assumptions 
above. There is a slight increase in inpatient visits for both reform scenarios, factoring in 
aging and health status of the veteran population. Forecasted visits per patients treated 
then were used to drive future costs and capacity needs.
Table 5: Forecasted Visit/Patients Treated by
Health Care Category
•
•
•
Visits/Patients Treated
Ambulatory Care
Inpatient Care
Rehabilliation Care
Mental Health 
Long-term Care
Dental Care
CHAMPVA, Spina Bifida, 
FMP, CWVV
Readjustment Counseling
Total 
Baseline Model Reform Modern Scenario 1 Reform Modern Scenario 2
2013
90,180,000 
623,839 
15,996 
152,863 
108,625 
4,182,000 
13,764,000 
1,540,000 
110,567,323 
2025
88,208,400 
646,199 
15,648 
149,521 
106,261 
4,090,569 
13,451,197 
  
1,506,331 
108,174,127 
2025
88,486,373 
648,474 
15,703 
149,992 
106,635 
4,103,460 
13,451,197 
  
1,511,078 
108,472,912 
 
Chg 13-25
(1,971,600)
22,360 
(348)
(3,342)
(2,364)
(91,431)
(312,803)
  
(33,669)
(2,393,196)
Chg 13-25
(1,693,627)
24,635 
(293)
(2,871)
(1,990)
(78,540)
(312,803)
  
(28,922)
(2,094,411)
CAGR 13-25
-0.18%
0.29%
-0.18%
-0.18%
-0.18%
-0.18%
-0.19%
-0.18%
-0.18%
CAGR 13-25
-0.16%
0.32%
-0.15%
-0.16%
-0.15%
-0.16%
-0.19%
-0.16%
-0.16%
2025
75,750,569 
549,287 
13,301 
128,404 
90,325 
3,512,851 
12,554,797 
  
1,293,589 
93,893,124 
Chg 13-25
(14,429,431)
(74,552)
(2,695)
(24,459)
(18,300)
(669,149)
(1,209,203)
  
(246,411)
(16,674,199)
 
CAGR 13-25
-1.44%
-1.05%
-1.53%
-1.44%
-1.53%
-1.44%
-0.76%
-1.44%
-1.35%
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   Revenue
   Medical Services
   Medical Support & Compliance
   Facilities
   Medical Programs Total 
   Medical Collections Fund
   Total Revenue
   Expenses
   Personal Services & Benefits
   Travel & Transport of Persons
   Transportation of Things
   Comm., Utilites & Oth. Rent
   Printing & Reproduction
   Other Services
   Supplies & Materials
   Equipment
   Lands & Structures
   Grants, Subsidies & 
   Contributions
   Imputed Interest
   Total Expenses
   Net Income  
   (incl. Med Collect Fund)
2008
$30,752,206 
$3,953,539 
$4,682,250 
$39,387,995 
$2,477,880 
$41,865,875 
2008
$19,688,531 
$531,839 
$36,275 
$1,059,908 
$17,122 
$7,614,638 
$6,670,044 
$1,479,978 
$1,626,562 
$662,323 
$775 
$39,387,995 
$2,477,880 
2009
$33,810,785 
$4,383,081 
$5,076,201 
$43,270,067 
$2,798,195 
$46,068,262 
2009
$22,189,733 
$807,096 
$32,381 
$1,103,446 
$21,577 
$8,650,273 
$7,127,218 
$784,464 
$1,775,511 
$778,368 
$-00 
$43,270,067 
$2,798,195 
2010
$37,390,193 
$5,022,103 
$5,803,674 
$48,215,970 
$2,837,904 
$51,053,874 
2010
$24,044,986 
$950,642 
$46,542 
$1,215,620 
$31,344 
$9,845,179 
$7,865,114 
$1,083,275 
$2,296,504 
$836,156 
$608 
$48,215,970 
$2,837,904
2011
$40,203,561 
$5,351,468 
$5,801,870 
$51,356,899 
$2,772,546 
$54,129,445 
2011
$25,513,783 
$1,052,867 
$40,143 
$1,289,809 
$82,360 
$10,547,995 
$8,304,589 
$1,411,118 
$2,088,025 
$1,025,888 
$322 
$51,356,899 
$2,772,546 
2012
$43,031,633 
$5,427,405 
$5,409,370 
$53,868,408 
$2,814,888 
$56,683,296 
2012
$26,092,864 
$1,037,993  
$37,119 
$1,404,117 
$32,259 
$10,985,940 
$8,789,755 
$2,619,533 
$1,706,628 
$1,161,923 
$279 
$53,868,410 
$2,814,886 
 
2013
$44,251,486 
$5,738,337 
$5,463,388 
$55,453,211 
$2,931,284 
$58,384,495 
2013
$27,373,624 
$989,412 
$41,289  
$1,486,830 
$33,390 
$12,075,366 
$8,424,262 
$2,005,927 
$1,565,541 
$1,457,316 
$253 
$55,453,210 
$2,931,285 
Chg 08-13
13,499,280 
1,784,798 
781,138 
$16,065,216 
453,404 
$16,518,620 
Chg 08-13
$7,685,093 
$457,573 
$5,014 
$426,922 
$16,268 
$4,460,728 
$1,754,218 
$525,949 
$(61,021)
$794,993 
$(522)
$16,065,215
CAGR 08-13
7.55%
7.74%
3.13%
7.08%
3.42%
6.88%
CAGR 08-13
6.81%
13.22%
2.62%
7.00%
14.29%
9.66%
4.78%
6.27%
-0.76%
17.08%
-20.06%
7.08%  
VHA as an Independent Health Care System 
To assess the VHA as an independent health care system and the VA as a payor, we 
converted the current VA obligations cost structure into revenues and expenses and 
constructed the models such that future expenditures would rise and fall with the 
patient population – a mix of variable and fixed costs. 
In the congressional submission reports, there are two main data tables: obligations by 
program and obligations by object. The expenditures in the obligations by program are 
aligned with visits by health category and were, therefore, deemed to be a logical starting 
point to develop “revenues” for the VHA. Obligations by object are typical expense 
categories and were relabeled as “expenses” for the VHA. Both of these tables are 
provided for Medical Services, Medical Support & Compliance and Medical Facilities. 
Today, and historically, the totals for the two tables are equal (see Table 6 and Figure 1). 
Of note, the totals below may not match exactly due to rounding errors based on our 
assumptions for fixed and variable costs (see appendix for details). 
Table 6: Medical Services Revenues and Expenses for the 
VHA as an Independent Health Care System
Notes: Totals for medical cost total and expense totals may vary slightly due to rounding error 
2013 revenues modified to more closely match average expenditures/pt/pg from VHA office of policy and planning (see final report for details)
Disclaimer – We recognize the revenues and expenses (historical appropriations to congress) presented above may not include all expenses for VHA.  
These were used to assess the fiscal impact of the reforms as they relate to “direct” Medical Care for the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. 
VHA REVENUES AND EXPENSES (DOLLARS IN 000) 
85
To project future revenues, we held constant costs per visit by health care category and 
program (medical service, support & compliance, and facilities). We also included dollars 
from the Medical Care Collections funds (parking, 3rd party collections, co-pays, etc.) and 
assumed revenues would grow 4% per year based on estimated growth rates for Medicare 
expenditures.80 We then used the forecasted revenues to calculate average expenditures 
per patient per Priority Group. Table 7 shows the average expenditures per patient per 
Priority Group obtained from VHA office of policy and planning statistics and our 
2013 calculations using cost data from the congressional submission reports.
Table 7: Data Reconciliation for 2013 Average Expenditures 
per Patient per Priority Group
2013 AVERAGE EXPENDITURES/PATIENT/PRIORITY GROUP
    Priority Group
    1
    2
    3
    4
    5
    6
    7
    8
    Non-Veterans
2013 VHA Planning 
Statistics (va.gov)
 $11,598 
 $5,734 
 $5,546 
 $21,597 
 $8,386 
 $2,983 
 $5,431 
 $3,373 
 $1,276 
2013 (Congressional 
Report Totals)
 $14,019 
 $6,931 
 $6,704 
 $26,105 
 $10,136 
 $3,606 
 $6,564 
 $4,077 
 $1,542 
2013 Modified 
 $11,840 
 $5,854 
 $5,662 
 $22,048 
 $8,561 
 $3,045 
 $5,544 
 $3,443 
 $1,303 
The average expenditures per patient per Priority Group based on the congressional 
submission reports are significantly higher than the VHA statistics. We originally 
included support and compliance and facilities as revenue given the footnotes that 
they include a portion of direct care obligations.  After reviewing the obligations 
by object (expenses), we identified five categories that could be considered indirect 
costs of care:  Travel & Transport of Persons, Communications/Utilities and Other/
Rent, Printing and Reproduction, Lands and Structures, and Equipment. We then 
removed the equivalent dollar amount for each of these categories from our revenue 
totals. We did not remove equipment from Medical Services as we presumed this 
is directly related to patient care. The total decrease in obligations by programs was 
12.0% of the total appropriations requested. The result is a modified 2013 average 
expenditures per patient per Priority Group. From Table 7, “2013 Modified” more 
closely aligns with the statistics from the VHA Office of Policy and Planning.  
By 2025 the baseline model revenues and expenses are forecasted to reach $68.4 billion 
and $73.1 billion, respectively. While the model shows a negative net income of $4.7 
billion, this should be viewed as one data point to start the discussion around how the 
VHA should strategically plan for growing revenues and controlling expenses. 
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Table 8: Baseline Forecasted Revenues and Expenses 
for the New Independent VHA
   Revenue
   Medical Services
   Medical Support & Compliance
   Facilities
   Medical Programs Total 
   Medical Collections Fund
   Total Revenue
   Expenses
   Personal Services & Benefits
   Travel & Transport of Persons
   Transportation of Things
   Comm., Utilites & Oth. Rent
   Printing & Reproduction
   Other Services
   Supplies & Materials
   Equipment
   Lands & Structures
   Grants, Subsidies & 
   Contributions
   Imputed Interest
   Total Expenses
   Net Income (incl. Med 
   Collect Fund)
2013 Modified
$40,100,661 
$4,397,797 
$2,335,520 
$46,833,978 
$2,931,284 
$49,765,262 
2013
$27,373,624 
$989,412 
$41,289 
$1,486,830 
$33,390 
$12,075,366 
$8,424,262 
$2,005,927 
$1,565,541 
$1,457,316 
$253 
$55,453,210 
$(5,687,948)
2025
$54,548,245 
$5,970,802 
$3,168,458 
$63,687,505 
$4,693,080 
$68,380,585 
2025
$36,813,579 
$1,255,848 
$52,408 
$1,887,214 
$42,381 
$15,327,106 
$11,329,418 
$2,546,097 
$1,987,121 
$1,849,752 
$321  
$73,091,246 
$(4,710,661)
Chg 13-25
$14,447,584 
$1,573,005 
$832,938 
$16,853,527 
$1,761,796 
$18,615,323 
Chg 13-25
$9,439,955 
$266,436 
$11,119 
$400,384 
$8,991 
$3,251,740 
$2,905,156 
$540,170 
$421,580 
$392,436 
$68 
$17,638,036 
CAGR 13-25
2.60%
2.58%
2.57%
2.59%
4.00%
2.68%
CAGR 13-25
2.50%
2.01%
2.01%
2.01%
2.01%
2.01%
2.50%
2.01%
2.01%
2.01%
2.01%
2.33%
VHA REVENUES AND EXPENSES (DOLLARS IN 000) 2025 BASELINE MODEL
Notes: Totals for medical cost total and expense totals may vary slightly due to rounding errors
2013 revenues modified to more closely match average expenditures/pt/pg from VHA office of policy and planning (see final report for details)
Removed travel related expenses in 2017; assumes no incremental growth in homeless for the VHA 
For the reform scenarios, it is very difficult to predict who may choose to remain 
grandfathered in and who may choose to receive care outside the VHA. Rather than 
trying to pinpoint a specific dollar amount, we developed a sensitivity analysis to show 
the potential fiscal impact on revenues, expenses, net income and capacity based on the 
VHA’s ability to attract VA patients (see Table 9). For example, if the VHA was only 
able to capture 50% of the patient population by 2025, expenses (which not follow the 
patients) would decrease to ~$42.5 billion from $55.5 billion in 2013 and bed need 
decreases from ~86,000 to ~38,000 over the same time period. While we did find a 
2005 data source on existing number of beds, this appeared to be outdated and did not 
align with the Average Daily Census (ADC) data in the congressional reports. As such, 
we choose not to use these values for comparative purposes. A more comprehensive 
capacity is needed – by geography – to better understand VHA bed need. 
Similar to the baseline model, the reform scenario projections should be viewed as a guide 
to inform strategic planning efforts at the VHA. Potential strategic topics include: (1) 
determining how to grow volumes by competing for market share by payor by geography 
(2) ensuring the right resources and capabilities to negotiate favorable rates with insurers 
and (3) identifying expense control/efficiency strategies (e.g., consolidating or repurposing 
low use facilities, reassessing FTEs – both administration and providers by specialty).
Table 9: Reform Scenarios Sensitivity Analysis
   New VHA
   Patient Share
   Total Patients
   Total Revenue*
   Total Expense*
   Net Income*
   Total Beds Needed
*in thousands
2013
100%
6,484,664 
$49,765,262 
$55,453,210 
$(5,687,948)
86,043 
2025 Reform Scenario 1 - Sensitivity Analysis
100%
6,342,890 
$75,417,369 
$85,050,702 
$(9,633,333)
 76,310
75%
4,757,168 
$57,736,297 
$63,788,027 
$(6,051,730)
 57,232
50%
3,171,445 
$40,055,225 
$42,525,351 
$(2,470,126)
38,155 
25%
1,585,723 
$22,374,152 
$21,262,676 
$1,111,477 
19,077
   New VHA
   Patient Share
   Total Patients
   Total Revenue*
   Total Expense*
   Net Income*
   Total Beds Needed
*in thousands
2013
100%
6,484,664 
$49,765,262 
$55,453,210 
$(5,687,948)
 86,043 
2025 Reform Scenario 2 - Sensitivity Analysis
100%
 6,362,879 
$75,511,092 
$85,318,724 
$(9,807,632)
 76,578 
75%
 4,772,159 
$57,806,589 
$63,989,043 
$(6,182,454)
 57,434 
50%
 3,181,439 
$40,102,086 
$42,659,362 
$(2,557,276)
  
38,289 
25%
 1,590,720 
$22,397,583 
$21,329,681 
$1,067,902 
  
19,145 
Note: For the reform scenarios we removed travel related expenses starting in 2017 (assuming the independent VHA would no longer be obligated to pay 
for these expenditures). We also assumed no incremental growth in the homeless program as provided by the VHA. The VA may choose to continue these 
programs through a different funding stream.
VA as a Payor
Transitioning the VA into a payor is a fundamental change in how the VA currently 
pays for veterans’ health care services. The VA is proactive in creating eligibility criteria 
for enrollment, yet could be described as reactive in paying for health care services (e.g., 
expenditures are tied to actual utilization of services or presumed utilization of services 
based on the allocation of dollars in congressional submission reports and VHA office 
of policy and planning statistics). 
Given limited publicly available data by Priority Group by age by income level, we were 
not able to assess the fiscal impact of the reforms as specifically outlined in the Veterans 
Independence Act (e.g., Medicare vs. Non-Medicare-eligible veterans or income levels). 
We assumed all new patients starting in 2017 would be enrolled in the premium support 
model (PSM). Also, as it is nearly impossible to predict patient behavior, we made 
the following assumptions around the potential uptake of the PSM for those patients 
grandfathered in (see Table 10). 87
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Table 10: Range of Potential Patient Update of the PSM 
by Priority Group 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR GRANDFATHERED IN VS. PSM
  Priority Group     Low  High
  1. >50% service-connected disabilities  25%  45%
  2. 30-40% service-connected disabilities  25%  45% 
  3. Former POWs et al., 10-20% disabled  25%  45%
  4. Non-service-connected disabled  5%  15%
  5. Low-income able-bodied veterans  5%  15%
  6. Vietnam, Persian Gulf vets et al.  25%  45%
  7. Low-income veterans willing to copay  15%  30%
  8. Higher-income vets (≤110% VA NIT)  10%  20%
  Non-Veterans     10%  20%
Rather than pinpointing a specific number of patients enrolling in the PSM, we developed 
a sensitivity analysis assuming a range of potential uptake. These percentages were based 
on a review of external reports and surveys including data such as the percentage of 
enrollees reliant on the VA for health care,81 a survey with questions around a veteran’s 
desire for health care choice even if they had to pay more out-of-pocket,82 and a survey 
assessing provider loyalty vs. lower cost insurance plans. We also engaged in qualitative 
discussions with CVA Taskforce members to assess the likelihood of patients 
transitioning to a PSM based on percentage of disability and income levels. 
From a payor perspective, it is typical to have a range of actuarial premiums and subsidies 
that vary across a population. Table 11 below illustrates the premiums, subsidies and 
actuarial obligations used to assess the fiscal impact of the PSM. The actuarial value (VA 
obligations) modeled is based on veterans having the option of receiving care outside 
the VHA. For patients choosing the VHA (similar to choosing an in-network provider), 
cost-sharing may change.
Table 11: Premiums, Subsidies and Actuarial Values for the PSM
Priority Group
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Non-Veterans
PSM Category
Diamond
Platinum
Platinum
Gold
Gold
Silver
Silver
Bronze
Bronze
Bronze
Premium
$8,130 
$8,130 
$8,130 
$7,485 
$7,485 
$6,812 
$6,812 
$4,033 
$4,033 
$4,033
Subsidy
$6,469 
$6,469 
$6,469 
$5,878 
$5,878 
$3,854 
$3,854 
$2,423 
$2,423 
$2,423
Total Payment
$14,599 
$14,599 
$14,599 
$13,363 
$13,363 
$10,666 
$10,666 
$6,456 
$6,456 
$6,456 
% Actuarial Value 
(VA obligation)
100%
90%
90%
80%
80%
70%
70%
60%
60%
60%
2025 Revised Payment 
(VA obligation)
$14,599 
$13,139 
$13,139 
$10,690 
$10,690 
$7,466 
$7,466 
$3,874  
$3,874 
$3,874 
Notes: (1) Priority Group 0 with diamond status was added to denote that service-connected veterans with 90% disability or more will be covered 
100% independent of health care setting or location. Due to data limitations (see below) we were not able to model this out. (2) The premiums, 
subsidies and total payments are based on the ACA metallic categories and do not include LTC.
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The 2013 premiums and subsidies proposed for the PSM are from the Department 
of Health and Human Services Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation http://aspe.hhs.gov Health Plan Choice and Premiums in the 2015 Health 
Insurance Market updated January 8, 2015. The premiums for 2015 were used as a 
proxy for 2013. To determine the premiums and subsidies for 2025 we applied growth 
rate projections from the Center of Health and Economy.84 
Table 12 shows the forecasted fiscal impact to the VA based on our models and scenarios. 
The total combined costs for the VA and veteran patients in Reform Scenario 1 and 2 
is roughly budget neutral at ~$73 billion compared to the baseline model – the latter of 
which assumes the VA would cover all VHA expenses as it does today. As the VA 
transitions to a payor, allowing for choice of services among eligible veterans, the obligation 
for medical care to the VA ranges from approximately $69B to $70B. 
Table 12: Fiscal Impact of PSM using Metallic Premiums
 and Subsidies 
VA as a Payer   2013 Actual1 2025 Baseline2 2025 Reform All3 Reform Scenario 1  Reform Scenario 2
Total patient population 6,484,664   5,447,072   6,443,566   6,342,890    6,362,879 
New patient population4       322,746    342,735 
Metallic Premiums and Subsidies
PSM VA obligation (new patients)       $4,145,420    $4,294,662 
Grandfathered In Choice Scenario
(Range)5,6         Low           High  Low       High
VA obligation
(GF’d In Chooses PSM)        $18,693,849        $9,954,004  $18,693,849     $9,954,004 
VA obligation (GF’d in no change)       $46,433,824         $56,346,358  $46,433,824     $56,346,358 
Total Grandfathered In       $65,127,674         $66,300,363  $65,127,674      $66,300,363 
VA Obligations for 
Medical Care  $55,453,211 $73,091,246  $72,029,688  $69,273,094         $70,445,783  $69,422,336      $70,595,025 
Patient obligation (new patients)       $518,235    $582,196 
Patient obligation 
(GF’d In choosing PSM)       $4,087,480            $2,077,544  $4,087,480        $2,077,544 
Total patient obligations       $4,605,715            $2,595,779            $4,669,676        $2,659,740 
Total Costs (VA and Patient)7 $55,453,211 $73,091,246  $72,029,688  $73,878,808          $73,041,562  $74,092,011      $73,254,765 
1. 2013 VA obligation for medical care are equal all medical care appropriations 
2. 2025 Baseline assumes VA will operate as it does today, total VA obligations for care equal total expense for VHA 
3. 2025 Reform assumes all patients (PG 1-8 and non-veterans) get PSM with no cost sharing; if PG4 and 5 excess costs were factored in, obligations would increase to $82.8B
4. New population starts in 2017; Reform Scenario 1 newly eligibile is focused on service connected veterans (PG 1-3); Scenario 2 includes newly eligible in PGs 1-6
5. Choice range - Low = lower obligations for VA/higher uptake of PSM; High = higher obligations for VA/lower update of PSM
6. Grandfathered in based on assumptions of update by priorty group (see appendix or table X)
7 No patient obligations except for reform scenarios 1 and 2
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As mentioned above, this fiscal impact analysis is one example of how a VA-adapted 
premium support system could work. 
As an alternative, and based on the VA pays for health care services today, we also 
assessed the potential fiscal impact of the PSM using forecasted average expenditures 
per patient per Priority Group. To calculate forecasted average expenditures per patient 
per Priority Group we used the total 2025 revenue for the VHA and applied an 
adjustment factor to maintain the same distribution and growth rates as the 2008 to 2013 
average expenditures per patient per Priority Group. The 2025 average expenditure per 
patient per Priority Group are shown in column A in the table below. 
Table 13: Cost Differential between Expenditures/PT/PG and 
PSM Premiums and Subsidies
Priority Group
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Non-Veterans
PSM Category
Diamond
Platinum
Platinum
Gold
Gold
Silver
Silver
Bronze
Bronze
Bronze
A
2025 Average 
Expenditures/
Patient/PG
 $14,097 
$14,097 
$8,191 
$8,802 
$35,729 
$16,697 
$4,689 
$9,189 
$6,225 
$2,631 
B
2025 Premium
$8,130 
$8,130 
$8,130 
$7,485 
$7,485 
$6,812 
$6,812 
$4,033 
$4,033 
$4,033 
C
2025 Subsidy
$6,469 
$6,469 
$6,469 
$5,878 
$5,878 
$3,854 
$3,854 
$2,423 
$2,423 
$2,423
D
2025 Total 
Payment
$14,599 
$14,599 
$14,599 
$13,363 
$13,363 
$10,666 
$10,666 
$6,456 
$6,456 
$6,456 
E
% Actuarial 
Value (VA 
obligation)
100%
90%
90%
80%
80%
70%
70%
60%
60%
60%
F
2025 Revised 
Payment (VA 
obligation)
$14,599 
$13,139 
$13,139 
$10,690 
$10,690 
$7,466 
$7,466 
$3,874 
$3,874 
$3,874 
G
Cost 
Differential 
(A - D) 
$(501)
$(501)
$(6,407)
$(4,561)
$22,366 
$6,031 
$(5,977)
$2,733 
$(231)
$(3,825)
Dollars in thousands
From Column G, there is a significant cost difference for some Priority Groups between 
the forecasted average expenditures per patient per Priority Group (column A) and the 
total premiums and subsidies (column D and F with cost-sharing). Publicly available data 
for VA health care expenditures are bundled by Priority Group or by health care category 
making it difficult to compare or reconcile the cost differential between expenditures and 
potential future payments. Also, the premiums and subsidies in Columns B, C and D, as 
laid out for the ACA do not include LTC. Since we are not able to assess LTC by Priority 
Group, we were not able to assess these costs in detail. For the purposes of this fiscal 
model, we assumed retired members of the uniformed services are already eligible for the 
FLTCIP, the fiscal costs of enrolling non-elderly vets into FLTCIP may be low. As more 
detailed data becomes available, it will be important to reassess all services including LTC. 
The table on the following page illustrates the fiscal impact using premiums as average 
expenditures per patient per Priority Group compared to the metallic premiums. Both 
assume costs sharing for those opting to enroll in the premiums support model.
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VA as a Payer 
Total patient population
New patient population4
Premiums = Avg. Expend/Patient/PG
PSM VA obligation (new patients)
Grandfathered In Choice Scenario 
(Range)5,6
VA obligation (GF’d In Chooses PSM)
VA obligation (GF’d in no change)
Total Grandfathered In
VA Obligations for Medical Care
Patient obligation (new patients)
Patient obligation
(GF’d In choosing PSM)
Total patient obligations
Total Costs (VA and Patient)7
Metallic Premiums and Subsidies
PSM VA obligation (new patients)
Grandfathered In Choice Scenario 
(Range)5,6
VA obligation (GF’d In Chooses PSM)
VA obligation (GF’d in no change)
Total Grandfathered In
VA Obligations for Medical Care
Patient obligation (new patients)
Patient obligation (GF’d In  
choosing PSM)
Total patient obligations
Total Costs (VA and Patient)7
2013 Actual1
6,484,664 
$55,453,211 
$55,453,211 
$55,453,211 
$55,453,211 
2025 Baseline2
5,447,072 
$73,091,246 
$73,091,246 
$73,091,246 
$73,091,246 
2025 Reform All3
 6,443,566 
$71,105,226 
$71,105,226 
$72,029,688 
$72,029,688 
6,342,890 
322,746 
$3,701,342 
Low 
$16,466,813 
$46,433,824 
$62,900,637 
$66,601,979 
$449,223 
$1,761,194 
$2,210,417 
$68,812,396
$4,145,420 
Low 
$18,693,849 
$46,433,824 
$65,127,674 
$69,273,094 
$518,235 
$4,087,480 
$4,605,715 
$73,878,808
High
$8,466,172 
$56,346,358 
$64,812,530 
$68,513,872 
$3,673,088 
$4,122,310 
$72,636,182 
High
$9,954,004 
$56,346,358 
$66,300,363 
$70,445,783 
$2,077,544 
 
$2,595,779 
$73,041,562 
6,362,879 
 342,735 
$3,766,948 
Low 
$16,466,813 
$46,433,824 
$62,900,637 
$66,667,585 
$477,339 
$1,761,194 
 
$2,238,534 
$68,906,119 
$4,294,662 
Low 
$18,693,849 
$46,433,824 
$65,127,674 
$69,422,336 
$582,196 
$4,087,480 
$4,669,676 
 $74,092,011 
High
$8,466,172 
$56,346,358 
$64,812,530 
$68,579,478 
$3,673,088 
 
$4,150,427 
$72,729,905 
High
$9,954,004 
$56,346,358 
$66,300,363 
$70,595,025 
$2,077,544 
$2,659,740 
$73,254,765
Reform Scenario 1 Reform Scenario 2
1. 2013 VA obligation for medical care are equal all medical care appropriations 
2. 2025 Baseline assumes VA will operate as it does today, total VA obligations for care equal total expense for VHA 
3. 2025 Reform assumes all patients (PG 1-8 and non-veterans) get PSM with no cost sharing; if PG4 and 5 excess costs were factored in, obligations would increase to $82.8B
4. New population starts in 2017; Reform Scenario 1 newly eligibile is focused on service connected veterans (PG 1-3); Scenario 2 includes newly eligible in PGs 1-6
5. Choice range - Low = lower obligations for VA/higher uptake of PSM; High = higher obligations for VA/lower update of PSM
6. Grandfathered in based on assumptions of update by priorty group (see appendix or table X)
7 No patient obligations except for reform scenarios 1 and 2
As mentioned above, this fiscal impact analysis is one example of how a VA-adapted 
premium support system could work. 
As an alternative, and based on the VA pays for health care services today, we also assessed 
the potential fiscal impact of the PSM using forecasted average expenditures per patient 
per Priority Group. To calculate forecasted average expenditures per patient per Priority 
Group we used the total 2025 revenue for the VHA and applied an adjustment factor to 
maintain the same distribution and growth rates as the 2008 to 2013 average expenditures 
per patient per Priority Group. The 2025 average expenditure per patient per Priority 
Group are shown in column A in the table below.
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Conclusions
It was extremely difficult to develop a comprehensive fiscal impact analysis for the 
proposed reforms given data limitations. In this report, we provide one way to merge 
and covert multiple data sources into a format where the VA dollars follow the patient. 
In doing this we were able to test the potential impact of what the VHA could look like 
financially as an independent health care system and the financial impacts to the VA as 
a payor. This report does not attempt to project future appropriations to congress for 
the VA as a payor or delivery system. The outcomes of our analyses should be viewed as 
directional and help guide decision-making until more detailed data becomes available. 
Patient Population Data Reconciliation 
The table below shows the differences in patient populations between the FY2015 
Funding and Appropriations Congressional Submission Reports and the VHA 
Office of Policy and Planning. The largest difference is for non-veterans. As noted 
below, the VHA Office of Policy and Planning does not include veterans who have 
visits with the readjustment counseling service only, state nursing home patients, or 
CHAMPVA (non-veteran) patients. 
APPENDIX TABLES
Priority Groups
PG 1-6
PG 7-8
Subtotal
Non-Veterans
Total
VHA Office of Policy 
and Planning
 4,475,731 
 1,244,883 
 5,720,614 
 296,487 
 6,017,101 
FY15 Congressional 
Report
 4,524,505 
 1,279,385 
 5,803,890 
 680,774 
 6,484,664
Difference 
(CR - VHA)
48,774 
34,502 
83,276 
384,287 
467,563
2013 ACTUALS
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Living Veteran Projections by Age
Forecasted Patient Population by Priority Group 
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Mapping of Health Care Categories 
Expense Assumptions
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